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This thesis evaluates the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 (PSA) from practical, theoretical and 
developmental perspectives. The PSA was created in response to the rise of New Psychoactive 
Substances (NPS), otherwise variously known and marketed as ‘legal highs’, ‘bath salts’, ‘research 
chemicals’, and ‘plant food’. In contrast to previous attempts to control recreational drugs – which 
individually list banned substances – the PSA employs a ‘blanket ban’ approach whereby all 
‘psychoactive substances’ are proscribed, subject to limited exemptions. 
The Government’s review of the PSA’s operation concluded that, overall, the Act has succeeded in 
its main goals of: ending NPS sales; ending the game of cat and mouse (whereby new substances 
are created faster than the Government can ban them); reducing psychoactive substance use; and 
reducing psychoactive substance-related harms. Chapter one of this thesis argues that the PSA has, 
in fact, failed to achieve these goals. Chapter two critiques the PSA from a primarily theoretical 
standpoint. It is argued that the Act conflicts with numerous normative principles of criminalisation 
(namely harm prevention, criminalising only conduct which is wrongful, and fair labelling) and of 
the rule of law (namely maximum legal certainty and proportionate sentencing). It is also argued 
that the PSA is an illegitimate exercise of state power, and some alternative (and more appropriate) 
means of regulating NPS are sketched. Chapter three considers the PSA’s continuing relevance in 
light of political and technological developments post-enactment, and its coherence with both 
international and domestic drug legislation and policy. It is argued that although the Act is coherent 
with international and domestic drug legislation, its justificatory rationale is threatened by 
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After passing through customs [the appellant’s] baggage was examined, and it was found 
to contain … a substance which was then new to the drug scene in this country.  
[Counsel for the appellant], who has understood very well that the first quality of any 
submission is brevity, described the situation as almost beyond belief. Speaking for myself, 
I wish I could think it was beyond belief.  
 

















The Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 (hereinafter ‘the PSA’ and/or ‘the Act’) is the latest iteration 
of prohibitive drug policy in the United Kingdom, designed to control myriad substances that have 
escalated from being a novel anomaly in the early 2000s to the basis for media sensationalism, 
moral panic, a multi-million pound industry, and increasing harms including fatalities in the last 
decade. These drugs can be collectively referred to as ‘New Psychoactive Substances’ (NPS). 
Defining this term further is challenging, as definitions ‘vary across organisations and … are often 
time dependent in two ways: firstly being recently detected, available or used, and secondly not 
classified in … drug control statutes’.1 The PSA defines a ‘psychoactive substance’ as: 
 
any substance which … is capable of producing a psychoactive effect in a person who 
consumes it … if, by stimulating or depressing the person’s central nervous system, it affects 
the person’s mental functioning or emotional state.2 
 
In this thesis, NPS are drugs that have recently emerged on the recreational market (regardless of 
the date of first synthesis) and have at some point been controlled under the PSA. This is in contrast 
to ‘traditional’ recreational drugs i.e. those prohibited by any UN Convention or (in the UK) 
substances controlled by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (MDA) before the PSA came into force on 
26 May 2016.3 This definition of NPS is employed to facilitate analysis of legal approaches to NPS in 
the UK, unhindered by, e.g., the post-PSA reclassification of certain NPS under the MDA (and the 
associated difficulties in disentangling the effects of the two concurrent frameworks), while 
focussing on those substances which the PSA was intended to proscribe.  
The PSA criminalises the production, supply, importation/exportation, and possession in a custodial 
institution – although not simple possession – of psychoactive substances for human consumption, 
and also the breach of prohibition/premises orders and access prohibitions.4 The range of 
substances prohibited is subject to limited exemptions, including food, ethyl-alcohol, nicotine, 
caffeine and drugs controlled under the MDA or international conventions.5 It confers on 
enforcement agencies powers of entry, search, seizure and destruction of substances controlled 
 
1 Amy Peacock and others, ‘New Psychoactive Substances: Challenges for Drug Surveillance, Control and 
Public Health Responses’ (2019) 394(10209) Lancet 1668. 
2 PSA, s 2. 
3 Home Office, Review of the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 (2018) 8 (HOR). 
4 PSA, ss 2-9, 26-7. 
5 ibid sch 1. 
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under the Act,6 and also civil sanctions to deal with prohibited activities.7 In contrast to previous 
attempts to control recreational drugs (which individually list banned substances) the ‘blanket ban’ 
approach in the PSA was intended to combat the rapid emergence of NPS without the MDA’s time-
consuming requirement of evidencing a drug’s harms before it can be added to the A/B/C harm-
classification system.8 The PSA required a review of the Act to be presented to Parliament 30 
months after commencement:9 this Home Office Report (HOR) is the most comprehensive 
evaluation of the Act to date.10  
 
This thesis evaluates the PSA (and to some extent, other legal approaches to NPS) more 
comprehensively than the HOR, from practical, theoretical and developmental perspectives. The 
European Commission’s guidelines on legislative evaluation inform the structure and research 
questions of this thesis.11 Chapter one considers the practical effectiveness of the PSA with 
reference to the Act’s goals. In contrast to the HOR’s findings that ‘most of the main aims of the 
PSA appear to have been achieved’,12 it is shown that the Act has failed to achieve most of its goals. 
Chapter two analyses the Act’s efficiency from a theoretical standpoint, informed by the findings 
from the previous chapter; it is argued that the PSA conflicts with multiple principles of 
criminalisation and of the rule of law, and that it is an illegitimate exercise of state power. Chapter 
three considers the PSA’s continuing relevance in light of political and technological developments 
post-enactment, and its coherence with both international and domestic drug legislation and 
policy. It is argued that although the Act is coherent with international and domestic drug 
legislation, its justificatory rationale is threatened by technological advancements, and it may soon 




6 ibid ss 36-50. 
7 ibid ss 12-25. 
8 Home Office, ‘New Psychoactive Substances Review: Report of the Expert Panel’ (2014) 18 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-psychoactive-substances-review-report-of-the-expert-
panel>.  
9 PSA, s 58. 
10 HOR (n 3). 
11 European Commission, ‘Better Regulation: Guidelines and Toolbox’ ch VI 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation-why-
and-how/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en>. 
12 HOR (n 3) 7. 
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Chapter 1: Effectiveness 
 
This chapter evaluates the PSA’s effectiveness1 by plotting the UK NPS landscape before and after 
the Act’s introduction, with reference to the Act’s goals of: ending NPS sales; ending the game of 
cat and mouse; reducing psychoactive substance use; and reducing psychoactive substance-related 
harms.2 Each goal is considered in turn, using wider evaluation criteria than those found in the 
Home Office Report (HOR).3 Attempting causal attribution of any changes in this landscape 
exclusively to the PSA is impossible due to: the vast number of interconnected factors that affect 
drug use; post-PSA controlling of certain NPS under the MDA; discrepancies in official statistics 
publications; and limitations of space. Therefore, this assessment of ‘effectiveness’ aims not to 
determine objective cause and effect with certainty, but to paint a picture of NPS in the UK, suggest 
answers to the more subjective questions regarding the Act’s goals (e.g., whether the PSA has been 
enforced ‘well’), and inform further discussion in the following chapters. It is argued that the Act 
has been ineffective in furthering these objectives, despite the HOR’s claims to the contrary.4 
 
1(1) End Sales 
 
The HOR identified ending the open sale of NPS in the UK as a primary goal of the PSA.5 However, 
among the guiding principles of the Government-commissioned Expert Report on the Psychoactive 
Substances Bill 2015 was ‘limiting the involvement of organised crime in the illicit drug market’.6 
Moreover, the offence of exporting a psychoactive substance attempts to control international NPS 
trade.7 Thus, the PSA’s goal was to control both open and clandestine NPS sales. The HOR’s narrow 
approach enabled the overall conclusion that ‘most of the main aims have been achieved, with the 
open sale of NPS largely eliminated’,8 sidestepping the question of whether the post-PSA situation 
of UK NPS sales is an improvement. 
 
 
1 European Commission (n 11, Introduction) 59. 
2 As identified in: Home Office, Review of the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 (2018) 8 (HOR). 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid 7. 
5 ibid. 
6 Home Office, ‘New Psychoactive Substances Review: Report of the Expert Panel’ (2014) 5 (Expert Panel) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-psychoactive-substances-review-report-of-the-expert-
panel>. 
7 PSA, s 8. 
8 HOR (n 2) 7. 
4 
 
1(1)(a) Open Sales 
 
‘Headshops’ (high-street retailers which openly sold NPS)9 and their clearnet (‘websites openly 
available on the internet’)10 equivalent were a major source of NPS. In 2013 there were estimated 
to be over 250 physical and 100-150 online UK-based NPS vendors.11 The proliferation of these 
outlets contributed to media sensationalism and the resulting ‘moral panic’ surrounding NPS,12 
despite relatively few fatalities.13 They were also a driving force behind the PSA as trading standards 
and medicines laws14 were easily bypassed with warnings that the products were ‘not for human 
consumption’,15 ‘research chemicals’, ‘bath salts’ and ‘plant food’.16 Earlier studies suggested the 
products sold were of low purity, mislabelled and even contained substances controlled under the 
MDA.17 However, it appears that as the market grew, so did product quality: despite significant 
variation across Europe, one later study showed UK NPS samples did correspond to what was 
advertised with >90% purity.18 High street retailers were legitimate (i.e. tax-paying) businesses,19 
and the Home Office recognised the employment of responsible retail practices by self-regulating 
parts of the industry, including refusing underage sales and the availability of harm-reduction 
advice (particularly with online sales).20 There was also  ‘little evidence of NPS use driving crime and 
disorder’,21 and ‘none of the 10 joint reports prepared since 2010 by the European Monitoring 
 
9 RSPH, ‘Removing Legal Highs from the High Street’ (2015) <https://www.rsph.org.uk/our-
work/policy/drugs/legal-highs.html>. 
10 Sarah Barber, ‘The Psychoactive Substances Bill 2015’ (HC Briefing Paper CBP 7334, 16 October 2015) 8. 
11 Expert Panel (n 6) 9. 
12 Ornella Corazza, Hui Yun Chan and Andres Roman-Urrestarazu, ‘NPS: Moving from Blanket Prohibition to 
a Functionalist Approach’ in Ornella Corazza and Andres Roman-Urrestarazu (eds), Novel Psychoactive 
Substances: Policy, Economics and Drug Regulation (2017) 126; Liviu Alexandrescu, ‘Mephedrone, Assassin 
of Youth: The Rhetoric of Fear in Contemporary Drug Scares’ (2014) 10(1) Crime Media Cult 23. 
13 Expert Panel (n 6) 12. 
14 E.g., The Human Medicines Regulations 2012, SI 2012/1916, reg 257 requires accurate labelling of 
medicines for human consumption. 
15 Rosalind Gittins and others, ‘Exploration of Use of New Psychoactive Substances by Individuals in 
Treatment for Substance Misuse in the UK’ (2018) 8(4) Brain Sci 58. 
16 Mark Baron, Mathieu Elia and Leonie Elie, ‘An Analysis of Legal Highs: Do They Contain What It Says on 
the Tin?’ (2011) 3 Drug Test Anal 576. 
17 ibid 580; Bram Miserez, Oscar Ayrton and John Ramsey, ‘Analysis of Purity and Cutting Agents in Street 
Mephedrone Samples from South Wales’ (2014) 32 Forensic Toxicol 305; Anca Frinculescu and others, 
‘Variation in Commercial Smoking Mixtures Containing Third-Generation Synthetic Cannabinoids’ (2017) 
9(2) Drug Test Anal 327. 
18 Tibor Markus Brunt and others, ‘Online Test Purchased New Psychoactive Substances in 5 Different 
European Countries: A Snapshot Study of Chemical Composition and Price’ (2017) 44 Int J Drug Policy 105, 
110. 
19 Expert Panel (n 6) 37. 
20 ibid 14-5. 
21 ibid 16. 
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Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol … on NPS … was able to provide any concrete 
evidence of the eventual involvement of established organized criminal groups’.22  
However, it was argued that headshops ‘normalised drug use, suggested NPS were safe … and may 
have made already vulnerable people more vulnerable’.23 Some studies have questioned the quality 
of products sold right up to the time of the PSA’s enactment,24 while brightly coloured packets of 
NPS were regarded as a marketing strategy to appeal to adolescents.25 It was also recognised that 
businesses which participated in Government consultations and demonstrated responsible 
practices were not necessarily typical of the whole industry.26 
 
1(1)(b) Pre-PSA ‘Invisible’ Sales 
 
The annual Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) ‘provides a better reflection of the extent 
of crime than police recorded figures as the survey asks about crimes that are not reported to or 
recorded by the police’,27 but ‘as a household survey … does not have good coverage of problematic 
or vulnerable drug users, including those who are homeless or in prison’.28 However, as pre-PSA 
NPS use was predominantly associated with middle-class users,29 the CSEW is a useful source in this 
context.30 
The 2014/15 and 2015/16 CSEWs indicated that dealers played a greater role in NPS supply than 
the internet, and the 2015/16 CSEW indicated that ‘a friend, neighbour or colleague’ was a more 
important source of NPS than headshops.31 Given the relatively recent ‘normalisation’ of social drug 
supply whereby a few individuals participate in a ‘small scale commercial enterprise’ to supply a 
 
22 Krzysztof Krajewski, ‘The Unbearable Lightness of Simplicity’ (2016) 112 Addiction 33, 34. 
23 RSPH (n 9). 
24 Fiona Catherine Measham, ‘Drug Safety Testing, Disposals and Dealing in an English Field: Exploring the 
Operational and Behavioural Outcomes of the UK’s First Onsite “Drug Checking” Service’ (2019) 67 Int J 
Drug Policy 102. 
25 Ornella Corazza and others, ‘“Spice,” “Kryptonite,” “Black Mamba”: An Overview of Brand Names and 
Marketing Strategies of Novel Psychoactive Substances on the Web’ (2014) 46(4) J Psychoact Drugs 287, 
289. 
26 Expert Panel (n 6) 14. 
27 ONS, ‘Crime in England and Wales QMI’ (2020) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/methodologies/crimeinenglan
dandwalesqmi>. 
28 HOR (n 2) 30. 
29 Shane Blackman and Rick Bradley, ‘From Niche to Stigma, Headshops to Prison: Exploring the Rise and Fall 
of Synthetic Cannabinoid Use Among Young Adults’ (2017) 40 Int J Drug Policy 70. 
30 The Home Office, Drug Misuse: Findings from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) for each 
year are available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/drug-misuse-declared>.  
31 ibid CSEW 2014/15 21; CSEW 2015/16 24. 
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circle of friends,32 and the ease of NPS acquisition from headshops, the original source of NPS in 
these invisible sales might have been visible retailers. Therefore, despite the evidence of a 
significant clandestine NPS market prior to the PSA, removing headshops may have contributed to 




The HOR extensively details the enforcement activities carried out under the PSA;33 only the main 
points will be summarised here. Since the Act’s introduction, ‘much of the visible sale of NPS in 
[physical] headshops appears to have ceased’,34 and ‘as of [the PSA’s implementation date] there 
were no remaining active [online] shops with a UK domain selling NPS’.35 The PSA’s civil 
enforcement mechanisms have rarely been used to close down headshops given the success of 
police and local authority efforts prior to the Act’s implementation;36 likely facilitated, though, by 
the impending threat of the PSA. This demonstrates the desire of most headshop owners to operate 
lawfully, although many outlets had ‘fire sales’ to shift remaining stock before the Act came into 
force,37 suggesting an abandonment of the responsible retailing they had previously demonstrated. 
  
Few stop and searches were conducted under the PSA to December 2017, which is expected given 
the lack of a simple possession offence; the generally low rates of NPS use compared to traditional 
drugs;38 and because MDA search powers might be more familiar to police officers.39 However, 
these powers have been used disproportionately among minority groups: 8% of individuals 
searched under the PSA during this period were black.40 This is less than the proportion of black 
people searched under the MDA over the same period (21%),41 but is nonetheless alarming given 
that the last census found that black people accounted for just 3.3% of England and Wales’ overall 
 
32 Ross Coomber, Leah Moyle and Nigel South, ‘The Normalisation of Drug Supply: The Social Supply of 
Drugs as the “Other Side” of the History of Normalisation’ (2016) 23(3) Drugs (Abingdon Engl) 255, 256. 
33 HOR (n 2) 16-28. 
34 ibid 30. 
35 Elle Wadsworth, Colin Drummond and Paolo Deluca, ‘The Adherence to UK Legislation by Online Shops 
Selling New Psychoactive Substances’ (2018) 25(1) Drugs (Abingdon Engl) 97, 99. 
36 HOR (n 2) 16. 
37 ibid 19. 
38 1(3)(a). 
39 ibid 18. 




population;42 drug laws have been driving racial disparities for decades;43 ethnic minorities are 
found with and use drugs ‘at a similar or lower rate than white people’;44 a 2020 Sentencing Council 
investigation found racial disparities in drug offence sentencing;45 and a recent report which notes 
that ‘disproportionality has increased as the use of stop and search has declined, indicating that the 
remaining use of the powers is more heavily concentrated on black … groups’.46 
The HOR contains customised data on PSA offences, prosecutions and sentences obtained from 
internal civil service sources.47 Only one of the post-Act quarterly Criminal Justice Statistics for 
England and Wales specifically mentions the PSA.48 Furthermore, PSA prosecutions are rare in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland.49 These factors make analysis of enforcement under the Act 
difficult. However, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) does publish quarterly case outcomes by 
offence type: in Q1 of the 2016/17 financial year (when the PSA was enacted) the non-conviction 
rate for all prosecuted drug offences in England and Wales was 6.1%, and remained at a similar 
5.9% in Q4 of 2016/17 and 6.2% in Q3 of 2017/18.50 By contrast, the HOR notes that over the same 
period there were 261 PSA prosecutions in England and Wales, resulting in 171 sentences.51 This 
equates to an approximately 34.5% non-conviction rate for PSA-specific drug offences,52 almost 5.7 
times higher than for all drug offences,53 even though ‘activity against the drugs threat continues 
to account for the largest proportion of UK law enforcement disruptive activity’.54  
 
 
42 ONS, ‘Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales: 2011’ (2012) 3 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/ethnicity/articles/ethnicityand
nationalidentityinenglandandwales/2012-12-11>. 
43 Niamh Eastwood, Michael Shiner and Daniel Bear, The Numbers in Black and White: Ethnic Disparities in 
the Policing and Prosecution of Drug Offences in England and Wales (2013) 41; Kojo Koram (ed), The War on 
Drugs and the Global Colour Line (2019). 
44 Eastwood (n 43) 15-6. 
45 Amber Isaac, ‘Investigating the Association Between an Offender’s Sex and Ethnicity and the Sentence 
Imposed at the Crown Court for Drug Offences’ (Sentencing Council 2020) 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/news/item/investigating-the-association-between-an-offenders-
sex-and-ethnicity-and-the-sentence-imposed-at-the-crown-court-for-drug-offences/>. Sentencing is 
explored at 2(2)(b). 
46 Michael Shiner and others, The Colour of Injustice: ‘Race,’ Drugs and Law enforcement in England and 
Wales (2018) 13. 
47 HOR (n 2) 21, 27. 
48 Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal Justice Statistics Quarterly, England and Wales, 2016’ (2017) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6144
14/criminal-justice-statistics-quarterly-december-2016.pdf>. 
49 HOR (n 2) 27. 
50 The CPS, ‘Case Outcomes by Principal Offence’ for each quarter are available at: 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/cps-case-outcomes-principal-offence>.  
51 HOR (n 2) 27. 
52 Appendix 1.1.1. 
53 Appendix 1.1.2. 






Post-Act seizures of NPS are still being recorded, demonstrating sales continue ‘albeit in a less 
visible manner’.55 Official data on NPS seizures were first collected in 2017/18, but were not 
available in time for the HOR: the latest figures show a 25% increase in NPS seizures between 
2017/18 and 2018/19.56 A post-PSA merging of markets has occurred, whereby organised criminals 
now supply both NPS and traditional drugs.57 The HOR provided evidence that this has increased 
the price and reduced the availability of NPS.58 However, qualitative evidence suggesting that NPS 
are now easier to source outside city centres59 was omitted from the HOR. Such ‘county lines’ 
dealing (where Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) gangs exploit vulnerable people to expand from 
cities to smaller towns) has become increasingly problematic since first assessed by the National 
Crime Agency (NCA) in 2014.60 Although primarily concerned with Class A drug supply, county lines 
dealing in NPS was identified almost immediately after the PSA61 and continues to play a limited 
role.62  
 
Even so, ‘shops and the internet remain important sources of NPS’.63 Some clearnet sites have 
emerged since the PSA,64 but darkweb (websites accessible only with special software, allowing 
users and website operators to remain anonymous and untraceable)65 NPS vendors have 
proliferated markedly.66 Notably, there have been no prosecutions for exporting a psychoactive 
 
55 HOR (n 2) 28. 
56 Home Office, Seizures of Drugs, England and Wales, Financial Year Ending 2019 (2nd edn, 2019) 23.  
57 ‘Gang That Tried to “Flood” Inverness with Drugs is Jailed’ BBC News (7 October 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-highlands-islands-49959942>; ‘Gang Members who Supplied 
Spice in Wrexham Jailed’ ITV News (15 October 2018) <https://www.itv.com/news/wales/2018-10-15/gang-
members-who-supplied-spice-drug-in-wrexham-jailed>. 
58 HOR (n 2) 29. 
59 Adam Lusher, ‘Deadly “Legal Highs” Can Now Be “Ordered Like a Takeaway” Because of Government Ban, 
Users Say’ Independent (2 December 2016) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/homelesshelpline/legal-highs-ban-war-on-drugs-spice-mamba-nps-
homeless-helpline-centrepoint-charity-christmas-appeal-a7449536.html>. 
60 NCA, ‘County Lines and Gang Violence, Exploitation and Drug Supply’ (2016) 3 
<https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/15-county-lines-gang-violence-
exploitation-and-drug-supply-2016/file>. 
61 NCA, ‘County Lines Violence, Exploitation and Drug Supply’ (2017) 10 
<https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/234-county-lines-violen-ce-
exploitation-drug-supply-2017/file>. 
62 NCA, ‘County Lines Drug Supply, Vulnerability and Harm’ (2018) 3 
<https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/257-county-lines-drug-supply-
vulnerability-and-harm-2018/file>. 
63 HOR (n 2) 38. 
64 ibid 34. 




substance, despite a 2018 study which ‘found that the UK was the second largest seller of synthetic 
cannabinoids after China’.67 There has been ‘rising concern that NPS might begin to be marketed in 
less economically developed countries’, driven by legislation including the PSA.68 The lack of any 




Predicated on ostensible claims that problematised the flawed but fledgling headshop industry, the 
PSA ended open NPS sales. However, clandestine NPS sales were not pliant to the Act’s criminal 
justice interventions, and SOC organisations and darkweb marketplaces now dominate the scene; 
this is a failing of the Act, which aimed to end all NPS sales. Enforcement under the PSA has been 
disproportionately directed at minority groups, and the non-conviction rate for prosecuted PSA 
offences is far higher than for equivalent offences under the MDA. It is therefore submitted the Act 
















67 HOR (n 2) 23-5, 34. 
68 Peacock (n 1, Introduction) 1671. 
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1(2) Cat and Mouse  
 
Controlling drugs under the MDA is a time-consuming process: the Advisory Council on the Misuse 
of Drugs (ACMD) must provide evidence of a drug’s harms before it can be added to the A/B/C 
classification system.69 Newly identified NPS emerged rapidly in Europe, quadrupling from an 
average of 12 per year in 2005-2008 to 48 in 2011.70 Temporary Class Drug Orders (TCDO) were 
introduced in 2011, enabling fast-track banning of NPS until further evidence of their harms could 
be collated.71 However, growth in NPS continued (doubling to 98 between 2011-2015)72 leading to 
the announcement of a ‘landmark bill [which] will fundamentally change the way we tackle [NPS] 
and put an end to the game of cat and mouse in which new drugs appear on the market more 
quickly than Government can identify and ban them’.73 This ‘fundamental change’ was employing 
a blanket ban, with a primary goal of the PSA being to provide an innovative method of curbing 
innovation, removing the (presumed) incentive to continue developing new NPS to exploit 
legislative loopholes.74 The HOR’s findings on achieving this goal are (to the extent of their accuracy) 
less controversial than the conclusions regarding ending NPS sales, as ‘[ending the game of cat and 
mouse] does not appear to have been achieved’.75 However, the HOR failed to consider the 
effectiveness of the PSA in relation to the wider theme of innovation that has been the hallmark of 
NPS and the Act itself: this thematic relationship is the subject of this section.  
 
1(2)(a) Pre-PSA Emergence 
 
The emergence of new drugs is not a new phenomenon: failed commercial/research 
pharmaceuticals have entered street-level trade since the 1970s,76 and waves of new, 
pharmacologically distinguishable chemicals each decade demonstrate this ‘cyclic feature’ of drug 
markets.77 Attempts to control these drugs have been of limited success: PCP, fentanyl analogues, 
 
69 Expert Panel (n 6) 18. 
70 EMCDDA, European Drug Report: Trends and Developments (2019) 33.  
71 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, sch 17. 
72 EMCDDA, European Drug Report (n 70) 33. 
73 Home Office, ‘News Story: Blanket Ban to Clamp Down on “Legal Highs” (29 May 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/blanket-ban-to-clamp-down-on-legal-highs>.  
74 HOR (n 2) 35. 
75 ibid 69. 
76 Fiona Measham and Russell Newcombe, ‘What’s So “New” About New Psychoactive Substances? 
Definitions, Prevalence, Motivations, User Groups and a Proposed New Taxonomy’ in Torsten Kolind, Betsy 
Thom and Geoffrey Hunt (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Drug and Alcohol Studies (2017). 
77 Justice NA Tettey and others, ‘Emergence, Diversity and Contol of New Psychoactive Substances: A Global 
Perspective’ in Hans H Maurer and Simon D Brandt (eds), New Psychoactive Substances: Pharmacology, 
Clinical, Forensic and Analytical Toxicology (2018). 
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benzodiazepines and amphetamines continue to be widely abused internationally despite decades 
of prohibition.78 NPS are similar to these substances in that they too have been largely developed 
from existing pharmaceutical research,79 but different in two important ways: the rapid momentum 
of their identification eclipsed that previously seen,80 and their endurance was often ephemeral 
and geographically heterogeneous.81 
 
1(2)(a)(i) Mephedrone and New Dissociatives 
 
Mephedrone, methoxetamine and ketamine have never been controlled under the PSA, but are 
helpful in analysing the pre-Act position. Mephedrone (an amphetamine/cathinone stimulant) was 
among the first-identified new substances,82 emerging at a time when cocaine and ecstasy purity 
was at an all-time low.83 It garnered widespread hysterical media attention84 and was controlled 
under the MDA in 2010.85 Some evidence suggests use subsequently fell,86 but ‘several key studies 
[showed] continued use and popularity’,87 stabilising at a lower rate of use only when traditional 
drug purities increased.88 Some reports indicate that mephedrone use is rising again, despite its 
unchanged ‘B’ classification.89  
 
78 UNODC, World Drug Report 2019 Booklet 1: Executive Summary (2019). 
79 E.g. Some SCRAs were originally developed as medicines: Roger D Pertwee, ‘The Therapeutic Potential of 
Drugs That Target Cannabinoid Receptors or Modulate the Tissue Levels of Actions of Endocannabinoids’ 
(2005) 7(3) AAPS J e625.  
80 EMCDDA, European Drug Report (n 70). 
81 Justice Tettey and Conor Crean, ‘New Psychoactive Substances: Catalysing a Shift in Forensic Science 
Practice?’ [2015] Phil Trans R Soc B 370. 
82 Kelly Morris, ‘UK Places Generic Ban on Mephedrone Drug Family’ (2010) 375(9723) Lancet 1333. 
83 EMCDDA, Recent Changes in Europe’s MDMA/Ecstasy Market (2016) 8.  
84 Jeremy Sare, ‘How the Media Helped Ban Mephedrone’ (2011) 342 BMJ 472. 
85 MDA (Amendment) Order 2010, SI 2010/1207. 
86 Giles Stephenson and Anna Richardson, ‘New Psychoactive Substances in England: A Review of the 
Evidence’ (2014) 2 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3685
87/NPSevidenceReview.pdf>. 
87 Kate O’Brien and others, ‘New Psychoactive Substances and British Drug Policy: A View From the Cyber-
Psychonauts’ (2015) 22(3) Drugs (Abingdon Engl) 217, 218. 
88 Stephenson and Richardson (n 86) 30; cf EMCDDA, Recent Changes (n 83) 8. 
89 Joanna Hockenhull, Kevin G Murphy and Sue Paterson, ‘Mephedrone Use is Increasing in London’ (2016) 
387(10029) Lancet 1719. 
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Methoxetamine (a new dissociative anaesthetic90 with historically consistent low rates of use)91 was 
the first drug subject to a TCDO,92 with limited evidence suggesting use fell following this.93 
However, use of ketamine – a relatively recently abused94 dissociative drug made class C in 200595 
and elevated to class B in 201496 and from which methoxetamine is derived97 – fell in the period 
that methoxetamine was legal,98 but has seen an increase in recent years.99   
This brief account of the effect of legal approaches on two ‘pre-PSA NPS’ presents slightly mixed 
results, but does contradict the widely-held presumption100 that the market and popularity of new 
drugs was driven purely by legal status: mephedrone remained popular following its ban and has 
actually seen a resurgence, and controlling (the comparatively less-popular drug) methoxetamine 
apparently encouraged the already-illegal, but relatively small ketamine market. This also 
preliminarily evidences that the creation of new drugs might have been (in part) a ‘trial and error’ 
strategy by manufacturers to determine which drugs would establish themselves among users (as 
was seemingly the case with mephedrone and dissociatives generally) and were worth pursuing. 
This could explain the largely ephemeral nature of most NPS including methoxetamine and 
Synthetic Cannabinoid Receptor Agonists (SCRAs). 
 
1(2)(a)(ii) Synthetic Cannabinoid Receptor Agonists 
 
SCRAs are drugs which have a strong effect on the human endocannabinoid system ‘with some 
functional similarity to natural cannabis’.101 First-generation SCRAs such as JWH-018 were 
controlled under the MDA in 2009,102 but second-generation SCRAs emerged with slightly different 
 
90 WHO, ‘Methoxetamine: Critical Review Report’ (2014) 10 
<https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/4_22_review.pdf>. 
91 Stephenson and Richardson (n 86) 14-5. 
92 Home Office, ‘Press Release: First “Legal High” Banned Under New Power’ (29 March 2012) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/first-legal-high-banned-under-new-power>.  
93 Simon L Hill and others, ‘Methoxetamine Toxicity Reported to the National Poisons Information Service: 
Clinical Characteristics and Patterns of Enquiries (Including the Period of the Introduction of the UK’s First 
Temporary Class Drug Order)’ (2014) 31 Emerg Med J 45.  
94 SC Deb (Draft Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2005) 31 October 2005 col 3.  
95 MDA (Amendment) Order 2005, SI 2005/3178. 
96 MDA (Ketamine Etc.) (Amendment Order) 2014, SI 2014/1106. 
97 WHO, ‘Methoxetamine’ (n 90). 
98 ACMD, ‘Ketamine: A Review of Use and Harm’ (2013) 19 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2646
77/ACMD_ketamine_report_dec13.pdf>. 
99 CSEW 2017/18 (n 30) 7. 
100 Expert Panel (n 6) 14, 19. 
101 Dima Abdulrahim and Owen Bowden-Jones, ‘Harms of Synthetic Cannabinoid Receptor Agonists (SCRAs) 
and Their Management’ (2016) 3 <http://neptune-clinical-guidance.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Synthetic-Cannabinoid-Receptor-Agonists.pdf>. 
102 MDA (Amendment Order) 2009, SI 2009/3209. 
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chemical compositions immediately after.103 Second-generation SCRAs were the largest emergent 
class of NPS,104 and were added to the MDA in 2013.105 Legality certainly played a role in their 
constant redevelopment.106 However, while most individual substances within each generation 
were short-lived,107 JWH-018 was still available up to and after the PSA’s enactment,108 further 
suggesting that demand (and perhaps identification of which NPS would remain in demand) was a 
key factor in their production; and that their intertwining with illicit market activity might have 
allowed them to ‘diffuse into the street pharmacopeia’.109 SCRA emergence has generally declined 
since 2014,110 but the current situation with third-generation SCRAs illustrates the difficulties faced 
by even the ‘landmark’ PSA. 
 
1(2)(b) The Blanket Ban 
 
The PSA controlled third-generation SCRAs until they were added to the MDA in December 2016.111 
However, they continue to be produced despite the attempt of both frameworks to control them:112 
global seizures of SCRAs by weight substantially increased between 2016-2017;113 and the UK’s NCA 
reports that the market is expanding, especially in prisons.114 This indicates that the endurance of 
JWH-018 is not an isolated case: a growing market composed of fewer new SCRAs means that 
specific SCRAs are becoming increasingly established. Thus, not only has the PSA failed to stop the 
development of new SCRAs, it has encouraged a marked change in the nature of SCRAs’ existence. 
Furthermore, while ‘subsequent generations of SCRAs have become increasingly potent’,115 the 
 
103 Paul Dargan and others, ‘The Impact of Changes in UK Classification of the Synthetic Cannabinoid 
Receptor Agonists in “Spice”’ (2011) 22(4) Int J Drug Policy 274. 
104 EMCDDA, European Drug Report (n 70) 33. 
105 MDA (Amendment) Order 2013, SI 2013/239. 
106 Expert Panel (n 6) 14, 19; Peacock (n 1, Introduction) 1670; EMCDDA, New Psychoactive Substances in 
Europe: Legislation and Prosecution – Current Challenges and Solutions (2016) 9. 
107 EMCDDA, European Drug Report (n 70) 17. 
108 Andrew Scourfield and others, ‘Synthetic Cannabinoid Availability on Darknet Drug Markets: Changes 
During 2016-2017’ (2019) 3(1) Toxicol Commun 7; UNODC, ‘New Psychoactive Substances: Overview of 
Trends, Challenges and Legal Approaches’ (2016) 5 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_59/ECN72016_CRP2_V16014
05.pdf>. 
109 Caroline Chatwin and others, ‘New Drugs, New Directions? Research Priorities for New Psychoactive 
Substances and Human Enhancement Drugs’ (2017) 40 Int J Drug Policy 1. 
110 EMCDDA, European Drug Report (n 70) 33. 
111 MDA (Amendment) Order 2016, SI 2016/1109. 
112 EMCDDA, European Drug Report (n 70) 33. 
113 UNODC, World Drug Report 2019 Booklet 2: Global Overview of Drug Demand and Supply (2019) 49. 
114 NCA 2019 (n 54) 9, 32. 
115 Giulia Costa and others, ‘Neuronal and Peripheral Damages Induced by Synthetic Psychoactive 




HOR claims that ‘the role of the PSA in this [latest potency] increase is not clear’.116 However, this 
overlooks the ‘iron law of prohibition’: a ‘phenomenon [which] follows fundamental economic 
logic’ whereby criminalising drugs does increase their potency, as there is greater incentive to 
produce increasingly concentrated substances to, inter alia, reduce transport costs and the risks of 
being caught.117  
The HOR used data from the UK’s Forensic Early Warning System (FEWS) as evidence that non-SCRA 
NPS continue to be developed and identified, but noted difficulty in ‘[drawing] firm conclusions [as] 
the number of newly identified NPS each year tends to be very small, and [the] results are only 
based on a selective sample of the whole market’.118 This sample is ‘selective’ because the HOR did 
not count MDA-controlled NPS which were included in FEWS.119 Thus, it could be hazarded that the 
HOR’s reliance on these figures downplays the true extent of novel substances generally appearing 
on Britain’s streets given how quickly NPS are added to the MDA,120 but despite this dilution the 
failing of the PSA to end the game of cat and mouse is nonetheless evident. Reasons given in the 
HOR for this continued emergence include consumer demand for unknown substances and 
potential incentives to create NPS to avoid drug laws in foreign jurisdictions and/or the harsher 
penalties in the MDA;121 however, this might also be due to the ‘trial and error’ strategy previously 
mentioned. 
 
The PSA’s blanket ban (and the generic ban on third-generation SCRAs) has, however, been 
successful in curbing innovation in one area of drug production: legitimate medical and industrial 
research.122 The scope of the Act was narrowed by exempting: investigational medical products as 
defined by the Human Medicines Regulations 2012;123 activities carried out by medical 
professionals in the course of their profession;124 scientific research approved by a relevant ethics 
review body;125 and by restricting the requisite mens rea of NPS production and supply offences to 
intention and/or recklessness as to the substance’s psychoactivity and/or likelihood of being 
 
116 HOR (n 2) 6. 
117 Leo Beletsky and Corey S Davis, ‘Today’s Fentanyl Crisis: Prohibition’s Iron Law, Revisited’ (2017) 46 Int J 
Drug Policy 156, 157.  
118 HOR (n 2) 36. 
119 ibid. 
120 The true number of NPS may be ‘4-fold higher than what identified by both the EMCDDA … and the 
UNODC’: F Schifano and others, ‘New/Emerging Psychoactive Substances and Associated 
Psychopathological Consequences’ [2019] Psychol Med 1, 10. 
121 HOR (n 2) 36. 
122 Predicted by: Alex Stevens and Fiona Measham, ‘The “Drug Policy Ratchet”: Why Do Sanctions for New 
Psychoactive Drugs Typically Only Go Up?’ (2014) 109(8) Addiction 126. 
123 PSA, sch 1. 




consumed for its psychoactive effect.126 However, qualitative evidence suggests these exemptions 
(and the published guidance for researchers)127 are not enough: 
 
There are so many groups in the UK trying to carry out clinical trials on NPS … however 
when it comes to the Act and the need for expensive licences, it’s not easy. You can easily 
break the law due to [the PSA’s] broad wording … when you do the research. The easiest 
way in many institutions is not to touch it.128  
(Dr Amira Guirguis, Senior Lecturer in Pharmaceutical Chemistry in the 
Psychopharmacology, Drug Misuse and NPS Research Unit, University of Hertfordshire.) 
 
Research is very difficult, as all psychoactive drugs are now [controlled].129  
(David Nutt, Professor of Neuropsychopharmacology, Imperial College London.) 
 
Research into all psychiatric medication has been dealt a significant blow by the [PSA], 
which makes it possible to commit a serious drug production offence without having any 
idea, and impacts research into any new medicine … the result of drug scheduling laws is 
that we senselessly discard hundreds of potential medications that could have valuable 
therapeutic properties.130 
(Dr Alex O’Bryan-Tear, Beckley Foundation.) 
 
Furthermore, after adding third-generation SCRAs to the MDA: 
 
Representatives from the research community contacted the Home Office and the ACMD, 
informing them that a large number of research compounds … were inadvertently captured 
 
126 ibid ss 4-9. 
127 Home Office, ‘Psychoactive Substances Act 2016: Guidance for Researchers’ (2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/psychoactive-substances-act-2016-guidance-for-
researchers/psychoactive-substances-act-2016-guidance-for-researchers>. 








under the generic definition. As a result, … institutions had to obtain …  licences to conduct 
certain aspects of their research.131 
(Baroness Williams of Trafford, Minister of State, Home Office.) 
 
A chemical included in [the SCRA ban] was tetrahydrocannabivarin [which] is the only 
known naturally occurring antidote to synthetic cannabinoids and so might have been a 
useful treatment for synthetic cannabinoid toxicity.132  
(Professor Nutt.) 
 
1(2)(c) Post-PSA Innovations 
 
Corresponding with the ‘iron law of prohibition’, almost immediately after the MDA’s enactment 
new forms of liquid, concentrated cannabis were being smuggled through London Heathrow 
airport.133 The PSA-induced increased potency of SCRAs has precipitated a similar innovation. UK 
prisons had been overwhelmed with predominantly SCRA-type NPS prior to the PSA,134 and a 
December 2015 report concluded that ‘NPS are now the most serious threat to the safety and 
security of the prison system that our inspections identify’.135 Yet, the latest annual prisons report 
for England and Wales states that ‘NPS had been underestimated’,136 signifying the vast scale of the 
current problem. This has been amplified by the fact that SCRAs are now much easier to smuggle 
into custodial settings, as A4 paper and photographs can be soaked in powerful new liquid 
concentrates of these drugs before being sold to inmates: there is now ‘categorical evidence to 
support anecdotal suggestions that [NPS] are entering UK prisons in this manner’.137  
Another post-PSA innovation is the mode of SCRA production itself: the NCA suggests that UK-based 
production is increasing, evidenced by rising importation of precursors138 (chemicals required for 
 
131 HL Deb 15 July 2019, vol 799, col 19GC-20GC. The MDA (Amendment) Order 2019, SI 2019/1323 
removed the 40,000-90,000 substances inadvertently captured by the generic definition. 
132 David J Nutt, ‘“Groundhog Decade Not Brave New World”’ (2020) 6 Drug Sci Pol Law 1, 4. 
133 Taonis [1974] 59 Cr App R 160. 
134 Karen Duke, ‘Producing the “Problem” of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) in English Prisons’ (2020) 
80 Int J Drug Policy 102479. 
135 HMIP, Changing Patterns of Substance Misuse in Adult Prisons and Service Responses (2015) 7.  
136 HMIP, Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales: Annual Report 2018-19 (2019) 8.  
137 Loretta T Ford and Jonathan D Berg, ‘Analytical Evidence to Show Letters Impregnated with Novel 
Psychoactive Substances are a Means of Getting Drugs to Inmates Within the UK Prison Service’ (2018) 
55(6) Ann Clin Biochem 673. 
138 NCA 2019 (n 54) 32. 
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synthesis of psychoactive substances which are not necessarily psychoactive themselves).139 Unlike 
the MDA (and associated subordinate legislation) which controls numerous precursors,140 the PSA 
is concerned only with substances used for their psychoactive effect directly. Paradoxically, the 
otherwise ‘catch-all’ PSA is actually too narrow in this regard.141 
 
The EMCDDA reports that availability of synthetic opioids is rising in Europe, driven by the USA 
opioid epidemic,142 SOC interest in global expansion and ‘broader changes in the illicit drug 
market’.143 These opioids include the highly toxic144 NPS U-47700, which was controlled by the PSA 
until being added to the MDA in 2017.145 The PSA’s inability to curb the innovative re-
development146 and rapid emergence147 of these drugs; the desire of SOC organisations to enter 
the now-illicit UK NPS market with increasingly potent substances by utilising the aforementioned 
‘trial and error’ strategy; and the UK’s experience with the post-PSA establishment of specific SCRAs 




The experience of previous prohibitive drug laws has been repeated: the PSA has failed to end the 
game of cat and mouse, and has instead encouraged further innovation in NPS production and the 
establishment of certain SCRAs in the street trade. These developments could continue to have 
negative effects in relation to synthetic opioids in the near future. 
 
 
139 INCB, Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (2015) pt III.  
140 The Controlled Drugs (Drug Precursors) (Intra-Community Trade) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/295. 
141 Though a charge of conspiracy to produce psychoactive substances could be brought in some cases, the 
PSA’s lack of a precursor offence conflicts with its aim of ending the game of cat and mouse via a blanket 
legislative ban. 
142 Which has been caused by opioid over-prescription: Beletsky and Davis (n 117). 
143 EMCDDA, Fentanils and Synthetic Cannabinoids: Driving Greater Complexity into the Drug Situation 
(2018) 9.  
144 WHO, ‘Expert Peer Review No.1 for U-47700’ (2016) 
<https://www.who.int/medicines/access/controlled-substances/4.1_U-47700_PeerReview_1.pdf>. 
145 MDA (Amendment) Order 2017, SI 2017/634. 
146 Kirti Kumari Sharma and others, ‘The Search for the “Next” Euphoric Non-Fentanil Novel Synthetic 
Opioids on the Illicit Drugs Market: Current Status and Horizon Scanning’ (2019) 37(1) Forensic Toxicol 1. 
147 Dima Abdulrahim and Owen Bowden-Jones, ‘The Misuse of Synthetic Opioids: Harms and Clinical 





1(3) Reduce Use 
 
A goal of the PSA was ‘to reduce the number of people using psychoactive substances, including … 
young people, the homeless and those in prisons’.148 The HOR concluded that the PSA has reduced 
NPS use in the general adult population, but that the findings are mixed regarding vulnerable 
users.149 This section explores the effectiveness of the PSA in achieving this goal by augmenting the 
HOR’s evidence with the latest statistics and literature. The quantitative and qualitative effects of 
the PSA on NPS use will be analysed in relation to various groups, and space will be given to the 
more speculative question of why these effects might have occurred in order to present a further 
dimension of the PSA’s efficacy in this area. PSA-induced displacement to traditional drugs will also 




Official surveys provide the most reliable quantitative estimates of NPS use among the general 
population (though true prevalence estimates are impossible),150 but as household surveys they 
cannot capture NPS use patterns among marginalised and vulnerable groups such as the homeless. 
The pre-Act 2014/15 Scottish Crime and Justice Survey (SCJS)151 asked a representative adult 
population sample whether they had taken ‘powders, pills, herbal mixtures or crystals sold as “legal 
highs”’: approximately 0.39% of all respondents reported use in the preceding 12 months.152 0.5% 
of all respondents reported nitrous oxide use in the preceding 12 months.153 The latest SCJS (which 
was not published in time for the HOR)154 indicates a reduction in the general population’s 
preceding 12 months NPS use to approximately 0.17% of all respondents.155 This large reduction is 
complicated by the small sample size of NPS users and the fact that a separate question was asked 
about SCRA use in the preceding 12 months, which 0.2% of all respondents answered 
 
148 HOR (n 2) 8. 
149 ibid 69. 
150 Katy MacLeod and others, Understanding the Patterns of Use, Motives, and Harms of New Psychoactive 
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affirmatively.156 Additionally, the ambiguity of the wording ‘legal highs’ has caused demonstrable 
uncertainty in respondents’ answers for years.157 Nitrous oxide use remained unchanged.158 
The CSEW evidences similar reductions which were covered in the HOR: the pre-Act 2014/15 and 
2015/16 surveys showed past-year NPS use among all respondents at 0.8% and 0.7% respectively, 
which fell to 0.4% in the post-Act 2016/17 and 2017/18 surveys.159 Nitrous oxide use remained 
unchanged since the 2013/14 survey.160 The latest, post-HOR, CSEW indicates stable rates of 
NPS/nitrous oxide use.161 
The HOR convincingly notes that this reduction in post-PSA NPS use is unlikely to have resulted from 
an unwillingness to disclose use following the change in legal status (as ‘the fall in NPS prevalence 
was driven by those [reporting] using another illicit drug’), but rather due to ‘the fall in availability, 
increase in price [and] other factors’.162 Understanding in more depth the extent of the role PSA-
induced changes in price and availability or ‘other factors’ played in reducing use is key to assessing 
the PSA’s effectiveness.  
UK ‘problem’ users (i.e. injecting or long duration/regular use) account for approximately just 10% 
of all drug users.163 Reasons for using NPS vary across user-types: ‘psychonauts’ (people who take 
drugs to subjectively explore their effects) are motivated by curiosity, pleasure and ‘researching 
purity, safe dosage and potential health risks’.164 Others use for reasons of low confidence and 
weight management;165 peer pressure/sociality; compulsion; self-management of physical and 
mental health issues; improving sex;166 quality and potency compared to traditional drugs;167 and 
because NPS are not detected in standard drug tests.168 Although the PSA has increased the price 
of NPS and (by some measures) reduced availability, the Act cannot address these other 
motivations. Legality plays only a minor motivating role,169 and cost appears to have been less 
important than other factors in pre-Act Scottish170 and Northern Irish171 NPS use. Furthermore, 
primary reasons for NPS cessation coinciding with the PSA’s enactment included bad personal 
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experiences; witnessing negative effects on others; and damage to health and relationships.172 
These reasons are similarly unattributable to the PSA as they reflect individual experiences 
irrespective of the law. 
The HOR noted difficulties in causally establishing displacement from NPS to other substances post-
Act due to the small number of NPS users and limitations of official statistics, concluding there was 
insufficient evidence for this in the general population.173 However, there are correlations between 
reductions in NPS use and increases in other drug use in official statistics,174 and there is 
quantitative and qualitative evidence suggesting displacement to traditional drugs due to the 
increased price of NPS, particularly among (but not limited to) vulnerable users.175  
 
1(3)(b) Children  
 
Aggravating factors in the offence of supplying or offering to supply psychoactive substances under 
the PSA include dealing in the vicinity of a school and using under-18s as couriers,176 but the HOR 
noted no statistically significant post-Act change in NPS use among children aged 11-15, and also 
evidenced that the Act has encouraged displacement to traditional drugs in other young age 
groups.177 A recent study of predominantly English NPS users found increased use among under-
18s.178 These results are mirrored by a 2018 Scottish Government survey which indicated a small 
increase in 15 year-olds using and being offered NPS179 compared to 2015,180 and also showed 
statistically significant increases in the proportion of schoolchildren who thought drugs were easily 
obtainable181 and who agreed ‘it is OK to take legal highs’.182  
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Based primarily on a DrugWise survey of drug workers’ experiences and an Exeter-based study of 
38 homeless NPS users,183 the HOR concluded that ‘the evidence on NPS use among vulnerable 
users, including the homeless, is mixed’.184 Quantitative evidence shows that adults presenting for 
NPS treatment with a housing problem have increased from 32% in 2015-16, to 36% in 2016-17, to 
approximately 45% in 2017-18 and 2018-19.185 During the same period, NPS treatment numbers 
decreased overall from 2042 to 1363,186 suggesting rising levels of NPS use among the homeless. 
Both the ACMD187 and the latest EMCDDA UK report188 also indicate high levels of NPS use among 
homeless populations in Manchester, Newcastle, Cardiff and the UK generally. Research conducted 
immediately after the PSA’s enactment found a negligible change in young homeless NPS use,189 
and an October 2018 report from Wrexham Council described NPS use among rough sleepers as a 
‘significant issue’.190 In Glasgow, use of SCRAs191 and benzodiazepine-type NPS192 among homeless 
persons have been observed. Thus, contrary to the HOR, there is substantial evidence indicating 
the PSA’s ineffectiveness in reducing NPS use among the homeless. The link between NPS use and 
homelessness has been established in other EU countries due to low access to harm reduction 
services,193 and the ACMD has warned that ‘[drug treatment] funding cuts are the single biggest 
threat to … recovery outcomes,’194 suggesting the PSA’s criminal justice approach to NPS is not the 
most effective option for reducing homeless NPS use. 
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The HOR notes a rise in use and availability of NPS in UK prisons since the PSA, but downplays this 
by stating that ‘the PSA may not have had a significant impact on reducing NPS use in prisons’.195 
The latest HM Chief Inspectorate of Prisons for England and Wales Annual Report indicates a 
‘deluge of [NPS]’ leading to a ‘growing number of prisoners under the influence of [NPS]’.196 The 
equivalent Scottish report states that ‘use of [NPS] continues to have a detrimental impact … and 
links to high-level violence’,197 despite the PSA’s offence198 of custodial possession.  
Motivations for using NPS in prisons include ease of access; social acceptance due to high rates of 
use; avoidance of detection in drug tests; as a coping mechanism; boredom; addiction; and 
enjoyment.199 The PSA-induced increased ease of smuggling NPS into prisons200 has arguably 
exacerbated the motivation of easy access, derivatively increasing use and social acceptance. 
Recent research indicates that rates of NPS use are lower before and after imprisonment, with 
SCRAs regarded as a ‘prison drug’.201 Mandatory drug testing figures support this, as 7.3% of English 
and Welsh tests returned positive for NPS in 2018/19, over 18 times above general English and 




‘Chemsex’ (using drugs to enhance sexual experience) NPS users were regarded as a high 
prevalence/risk group in the pre-Act Government Expert Review of NPS,203 but were not discussed 
in the HOR. The main chemsex substances are controlled under the MDA,204 but ecstasy/ketamine-
type NPS and ethylphenidate have also been used.205 Although ethylphenidate was controlled 
under an extended TCDO before being added to the MDA in 2017 (thus never controlled under the 
 
195 HOR (n 2) 45-6 [my emphasis]. 
196 HMIP, Annual Report (n 136) 8, 32. 
197 HMIPS, HM Chief Inspector’s Annual Report 2018-19 (2019) 19. 
198 PSA, s 9. 
199 HMPPS, ‘Guidance: Psychoactive Substances in Prisons’ (15 May 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/psychoactive-substances-in-prisons>. 
200 1(2)(c). 
201 Sharon Grace, Charlie Lloyd and Amanda Perry, ‘The Spice Trail: Transitions in Synthetic Cannabis 
Receptor Agonists (SCRAs) Use in English Prisons and on Release’ (2020) 27(4) Drugs (Abingdon Engl) 271. 
202 HMPPS, ‘Annual Digest 2018/19’ (2020) 25 <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hmpps-annual-
digest-2018-to-2019>; text to n 159; Appendix 1.3.  
203 Expert Panel (n 6) 64. 
204 Hepatitis Scotland, ‘Chemsex in Scotland: Starting the Conversation’ (2016) 10-3 
<http://www.hepatitisscotland.org.uk/files/3014/7003/8716/Chemsex_in_Scotland__20_June_2016.pdf>.  
205 MacLeod (n 150) 31.  
23 
 
PSA),206 the HOR describes it as an NPS in relation to the PSA so it is included in this thesis.207 
Chemsex users are predominantly homosexual men,208 commonly motivated by pleasure, being 
already intoxicated, their partner’s use and to overcome internalised homophobia.209  
Recent research shows chemsex is increasingly common210 and widespread throughout the UK.211 
As all psychoactive substances are now illegal, the implication is that legality is not a major concern 
for users and that some displacement to traditional drugs may have occurred post-PSA. However, 
due to the low rates of NPS use both generally and in chemsex, a large-scale shift to MDA-controlled 
drugs may have had only a minor, unobservable impact. The only UK longitudinal study of individual 
chemsex drugs found that tailored health-based interventions among the sample participants led 
to reductions in the prevalence of both chemsex and chemsex-specific drugs between March 2015 
and March 2018.212 The drugs reported in the study were all controlled under the MDA and did not 
change in legal status, suggesting that health-based approaches are more effective than the law 
(including the PSA’s symbolic function/goal of discouraging psychoactive substance use) for 
encouraging cessation. 
Poppers (amyl/alkyl nitrites) are also commonly used in chemsex,213 and recent case law indicates 
they are illegal under the PSA.214 General prevalence estimates are unavailable in post-PSA official 
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1(3)(f) Sex Workers and Sexual Exploitation 
 
Evidence of the link between NPS and child sexual exploitation (including sex in exchange for drugs) 
was presented to the Public Bill Committee on the Psychoactive Substances Bill,216 and ‘involvement 
in the sex trade is often intertwined with drug use’,217 but this group was not considered in the 
HOR. A 2015 study of Welsh sex workers showed 44.8% used ‘mephedrone or NPS’ at least ‘a few 
times a year’ and 13.8% reported ‘almost every day’ use.218 Prostitution-funded SCRA use was also 
observed in Manchester immediately prior to the PSA’s enactment,219 and NPS use among sex 
workers continues post-Act in Northern Ireland.220 
The Welsh study indicated that the availability of Class A drugs was a major motivation for drug 
use221 and that the biggest obstacle to cessation was constant contact with drug dealers.222 As the 
PSA has shifted NPS supply to dealers, this might suggest that displacement to traditional drugs and 
little reduction in overall substance use has occurred post-Act. However, evidence to confirm this 
is extremely scarce: the EMCDDA notes ‘a great deal of the research and responses available in 
relation to women who use drugs is oriented towards opioid users [which necessitates] further 




While overall NPS use has decreased post-PSA, this has not occurred among the 
vulnerable/problem-using demographics the Act was intended to target. This is because 
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motivations for using NPS are often not susceptible to changes in the legal status of NPS, so the Act 





























1(4) Reduce Harms 
 
The HOR discussed potency, hospital admissions, numbers in treatment, deaths, and NPS-related 
violence and crime, concluding that the PSA’s goal of reducing NPS-associated harms has ‘been 
achieved in the main’.224 This thesis uses the more comprehensive drug harm criteria contained in 




Whereas the HOR contains customised data from statistics agencies,226 this analysis of NPS-related 
deaths is limited by the reliance on data from annual statistics publications, which are based on 
when deaths are registered (rather than when they occurred) and also include NPS controlled by 
the MDA for numerous years.227 However, the latest statistics have been published 3 years after 
the introduction of the PSA, so it is unlikely that the gap between the date of death and registration 
is significant enough to obfuscate analysis. Furthermore, the wider definition of NPS used in this 
thesis than in the HOR (for reasons given in the introduction) offsets the need to distinguish those 
NPS that have been moved from the PSA to the MDA. 
 
In Scotland, deaths in which ‘NPS were implicated in or potentially contributed to the death’ have 
soared every year post-PSA, from 74 in 2015; to 286 in 2016; to 337 in 2017; to 575 in 2018.228 In 
England and Wales, NPS-related deaths halved in the year post-PSA, but have since returned to pre-
PSA levels.229 While numerous years of data are required to reach firm conclusions, this casts doubt 
on the preliminary evidence suggesting the PSA might have reduced NPS-related deaths in England 
and Wales, and the advancement in the HOR that the PSA has reduced overall harms.230 Considering 
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the reduced NPS use in the general population,231 this increased (in Scotland) and unchanged (in 
England and Wales) mortality post-PSA indicates increased harm per user.  
 
1(4)(b)(i) Damage: Acute Toxicity 
 
Legal definitions of NPS focus on chemical structure, degrees of psychoactivity and their 
relationship with existing legal frameworks; treatment providers group drugs based on their 
perceived pharmacological effect. This creates difficulties in distinguishing NPS from traditional 
drugs, so hospital statistics must be treated carefully when analysing NPS-related toxicity, e.g., 
SCRAs are grouped together with herbal cannabis despite the fact that the former produce 
significantly different effects and carry exceptionally higher medical risks than the latter.232  
 
A note in the Scottish figures states it is ‘highly likely’ the PSA led to a reduction in general acute 
toxicity admissions in the ‘other stimulant’ (i.e. not cocaine) category.233 However, ‘other 
stimulants’ was the main category among under-15s’ admissions, followed by ‘cannabinoids’ and 
‘multiple/other drugs’.234 Admissions relating to these (largely NPS) categories are broadly similar 
to pre-Act levels among under-15s.235 Also, there had been a general downward trend of admissions 
relating to ‘other stimulants’ since 2014-15 (2 years before the PSA was enacted),236 and the HOR 
also noted evidence that showed NPS-related concerns had been decreasing well before the PSA’s 
introduction.237 Further studies have claimed the Act had little effect on stimulant NPS admissions 
in Scottish hospitals, though pre-PSA enforcement activities including TCDOs did.238 Therefore, the 
PSA appears not to have reduced NPS-related acute toxicity in Scottish children, and the suggestion 
it has reduced toxicity admissions relating to ‘other stimulants’ is questionable. There has been a 
sharp increase in Scottish toxicity admissions in the ‘sedative/hypnotic’ category (which includes 
etizolam and other benzodiazepine-type NPS) since the PSA’s introduction following numerous 
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years of relative stability, and sedatives/hypnotics were also the largest percentage classified as 
overdoses.239 
The HOR noted a post-Act fall in English and Welsh drug poisoning admissions, but stated that ‘[due 
to the limitations of hospital statistics] it is not possible to identify with any certainty the extent to 
which these reductions in admissions were driven by the introduction of the PSA’.240 However 
overall drug toxicity admissions numbers have returned to the record-high levels seen in 2015/16, 
driven largely  by ‘other opioids’, ‘cocaine’ and ‘other/unspecified narcotics’, potentially suggesting 
displacement to traditional drugs and/or different NPS.241  Poisoning admissions among under-16s 
are currently at 2015/16 levels.242 Welsh drug-related admissions have increased 17.2% since 
2014/15 and those for cannabinoids (apparently partly due to SCRA use among the homeless and 
imprisoned) are now at ‘historically high levels’.243 
 
The HOR suggested NPS-related ambulance call-outs have decreased post-PSA;244 however, West 
Midlands and South Western Ambulance Services statistics since show a marked increase in call-
outs for SCRA-related toxicity.245  
 
1(4)(b)(ii) Damage: Mental Functioning 
 
Drug-related psychiatric hospital stays in Scotland are currently above pre-Act levels for all drugs 
except opioids, though there have been reductions since 2016/17.246 The equivalent English 
statistics indicate a post-PSA reduction, mainly driven by opioids and cannabinoids.247 However, 
those for ‘multiple drug use and other psychoactive substances’ are around 2015/16 levels.248 
Causal links between admissions reductions and the PSA cannot be established, though the mixed 
results do question the PSA’s efficacy in reducing NPS-related mental/psychological harms. 
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1(4)(b)(iii) Damage: Numbers in Treatment 
 
The HOR noted a ‘29% fall in [over-18s in England] presenting to treatment citing NPS’ post-Act.249 
The latest statistics show an 11% increase from the previous year, but numbers are still well below 
pre-Act levels.250 The number of under-18s presenting for NPS treatment in England was at a record 
low in 2018/19.251 These results are encouraging, but a 2016 Royal Society for Public Health survey 
indicated that the increased stigma resulting from prohibitive drug laws could deter up to one in 
four young people from seeking treatment,252 so the actual reduction in harms may not be so 
pronounced. As discussed, treatment numbers among people with housing issues have increased 
dramatically since the PSA.253 In prisons/secure settings, the overall number of people in treatment 
for NPS has ‘continued to rise’ from 6% in 2015/16 to 11% in 2018/19, but the number of under-
18s in treatment for NPS fell from 8% to 1% over this period.254 Scottish,255 Welsh256 and Northern 
Irish257 NPS-specific treatment numbers are no longer available as NPS are now grouped together 
with substances long-controlled by the MDA, though the HOR noted a rise in Welsh treatment 
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1(4)(b)(iv) Damage: Injecting and Blood-Borne Viruses  
 
People who inject drugs (PWID) are at heightened risk of harms including skin infections, 
cardiovascular disease, overdose and blood-borne viruses.259 Injecting NPS specifically carries 
further risks, including higher-frequency injecting260 (leading to more soft tissue infections)261 and 
equipment sharing.262  
 
A study analysed surveys from almost 13,000 Scottish PWID, finding a pre-PSA upward trend of NPS 
injecting in Scotland, from 0.2% in 2008-09 to 11% in 2015-16.263 This was driven largely by 
displacement from heroin to ethylphenidate injection, and was associated with an increase in 
Hepatitis C (HCV) prevalence.264 Scottish NPS injecting rates post-PSA are below 1%; chronic HCV 
prevalence has reduced;265 and NPS injection-related endocarditis infections in Edinburgh have also 
decreased.266 However, the PSA’s role in these changes is unclear, as evidence suggests that 
ethylphenidate toxicity admissions at Edinburgh Royal Infirmary fell by 96.7% following the 
ethylphenidate TCDO,267 and because HCV testing was at record high levels in 2017/18.268 
Scottish cocaine injecting rates rose sharply over the same period NPS injecting all but ceased (post-
PSA) following years of relative stability despite small year-on-year increases.269 Additionally, there 
is evidence of post-PSA displacement from NPS to cocaine in Scotland270 – and other research has 
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speculated that the PSA might have encouraged displacement from NPS to cocaine in the UK271 – 
suggesting the PSA might have contributed to the increase in cocaine injecting rates. In contrast to 
the reduction in HCV prevalence, there has been ‘a rapid rise in prevalence of HIV among 
[Glasgow’s] PWID population associated with homelessness, incarceration and a major shift to 
injection of cocaine’.272  
 
Causally determining the PSA’s effect on reducing harm to PWID is complicated by ‘the increasing 
availability of higher purity cocaine in the UK’;273 and the fact that half of all NPS-using PWID were 
based in Edinburgh/Lothian,274 whereas the increase in cocaine injecting was observed in Glasgow. 
Moreover, displacement from NPS to traditional drugs might actually reduce harms, as treatment 
for traditional drugs is better understood than for NPS-related disorders.275 However, the benefits 
of reductions in NPS injecting and HCV prevalence might be offset by the potentially PSA-induced 
displacement from NPS to cocaine injecting and rise in HIV prevalence. 
In England, Wales and Northern Ireland there appears to be a downward trend in NPS injecting in 
recent years, though this trend began years before the introduction of the PSA.276 
Chemsex is strongly associated with risky behaviours, including injecting and BBV transmission.277 
As mentioned,278 prohibitive drug legislation (including the PSA) appears to be ineffective at 




Early NPS/drug use is associated with future chronic dependence279 so the high rates of use and 
acute toxicity admissions among children may predict extensive future harms. Compulsion was a 
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key factor among pre-Act Scottish NPS users,280 and the rise in Scottish etizolam/benzodiazepine-
type NPS-related mortality signals increasing dependence-related harms due to the high addiction 
potential of these substances.281 NPS dependence-related harms among the homeless have likely 
been exacerbated by post-PSA increased use among this group, as there is a ‘well documented’ link 
between homelessness and drug dependence.282 PSA-induced reductions in NPS prevalence among 
the general population may not have reduced NPS dependence-related harms as approximately 
90% of UK drug users are not long duration/regular users.283 Furthermore, the PSA-induced 
displacement from NPS to highly addictive traditional drugs like cocaine284 may also predict 
increased dependence-related harms. 
 
1(4)(d) Loss of Tangibles/Relationships 
 
Whether NPS use is a symptom or cause (or both) of homelessness is unclear (though evidence of 
people losing tenancies due to NPS use exists),285 but the preceding discussion demonstrates the 
PSA has been ineffective in reducing harms among homeless people. Loss of educational 
achievements resulting from NPS use cannot be quantified, but as post-PSA use among children 
remains high and disengagement from education is common among young problem NPS users,286 
this harm has certainly manifested to some extent. The PSA’s lack of a simple possession offence 
precludes users losing clean criminal records, but those convicted of custodial possession may face 
increased difficulties securing work on release.  
Scottish NPS users commonly reported negative effects on relationships and financial problems 
(including benefits sanctions) due to compulsive NPS use and associated chaotic lifestyles.287 





280 MacLeod (n 150) 38-9.  
281 Francesco Busardò and others, ‘Is Etizolam a Safe Medication? Effects on Psychomotor Performance at 
Therapeutic Dosages of a Newly Abused Psychoactive Substance’ (2019) 301 Forensic Sci Int 137. 
282 Rebecca Gomez, Sanna J Thompson and Amanda N Barczyk, ‘Factors Associated with Substance Use 
Among Homeless Young Adults’ (2010) 31(1) Subst Abus 24. 
283 BMA (n 163). 
284 Eric J Nestler, ‘The Neurobiology of Cocaine Addiction’ (2005) 3(1) Sci Pract Perspect 4. 
285 MacLeod (n 150) viii. 
286 1(3)(b); Higgins (n 167) 32. 





The PSA has led to headshops being replaced by an expansive black market whereby NPS are 
smuggled along ‘county lines’ by SOC organisations, resulting in intimidation, serious physical 
violence, use of firearms, ‘cuckooing’ (where drug dealers take over vulnerable victims’ homes to 
operate from), human trafficking and child sexual exploitation.288 Seizures of NPS by number, doses 
and weight are increasing,289 and large amounts of benzodiazepine-type NPS continue to be found 
despite enforcement efforts to shut down clandestine laboratories producing them on industrial 
scales.290 Furthermore, the Act’s failure to stem NPS use in prisons has led to continuing ‘debt, 
bullying and violence’.291  
 
1(4)(f) Economic and International Harms 
 
Based on the government’s 2015 economic assessment,292 a back-of-envelope estimate of the PSA’s 
overall economic cost since enactment (to the publication of the most recent relevant statistics) is 
£827.6 million. This is over 2.7 times higher than the £297.8m which the 2015 economic assessment 
indicated the cost would be to the publication of the most recent relevant statistics.293 
The PSA has potentially contributed to harms internationally by incentivising NPS markets in less 
developed countries, as punitive UK controls make NPS production in less-regulated countries more 
attractive.294 Additionally, the PSA (as part of international efforts to control NPS) has likely 
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NPS-related fatalities continue to rise in Scotland post-PSA, and are at pre-Act levels in England and 
Wales. Noting the limitations of hospital statistics, the PSA appears not to have reduced NPS- and 
other drug-related acute toxicity and psychiatric harms, especially among vulnerable 
demographics. Although overall numbers in treatment have decreased, treatment numbers among 
prisoners and the homeless continue to rise. The post-PSA reduction in NPS-using PWID (and 
associated HCV prevalence) may be offset by PSA-induced displacement to injecting traditional 
drugs and a rise in HIV prevalence; and there is evidence to suggest that dependence-related harms 
continue, albeit masked by data limitations. The criminalisation of supplying NPS has created an 
expansive black market, allowing SOC organisations to, inter alia, violently exploit people through 
county lines operations. The economic cost of the Act is apparently significantly higher than was 
expected, and the PSA may well have contributed to harms internationally. Therefore, it is 
submitted that the PSA has failed in its goal to reduce NPS-related harms.
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Chapter 2: Efficiency  
 
Informed by the preceding discussion, this chapter analyses the PSA from a primarily theoretical 
standpoint. It broadly follows the European Commission’s guidelines on legislative evaluation by 
considering the PSA’s efficiency, i.e., whether the Act is cost-effective and proportionate.1 To avoid 
criticisms that the guidelines assess legislative efficiency only in socio-economic – and not 
jurisprudential – terms,2 this chapter deviates from the EC guidelines by defining ‘cost’ in the broad, 
non-economic sense, as ‘that which is … lost in order to obtain something’.3  
Part one of this chapter analyses the Act’s efficiency by looking ‘horizontally’ to the principles which 
underpin other criminal laws,4 namely harmfulness, wrongfulness and fair labelling.5 Dissonance 
with these normative principles of criminalisation is a ‘cost’ in this efficiency evaluation. Part two 
considers the ‘diagonal’ crossover between the preceding ‘horizontal’ analysis and the following 
‘vertical’ analysis: specifically, it considers the PSA’s adherence to the rule of law-based 
requirements of maximum legal certainty and proportionate sentencing.6 Part three employs 
Dubber’s paradigmatic ‘police’ and ‘law’ modes of governance to critique the Act’s ‘vertical’ 
efficiency, i.e., whether the mode of governance inherent in the PSA is a cost-effective, 
proportionate, and legitimate exercise of state power.7 After concluding the PSA seeks the benefits 
of both of Dubber’s paradigmatic modes yet achieves those of neither, the insights gained 
throughout this chapter are blended with Farmer’s ‘jurisprudence of security’8 to identify a 
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2 Dirk H van der Meulen, ‘The Use of Impact Assessments and the Quality of Legislation’ (2013) 1(2) Theory 
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The Quest for Principle’ in Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner and Patrick Tomlin (eds), Prevention and the 
Limits of the Criminal Law (2013). 
5 Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, 2016) ch 4. 
6 ibid 85; Malcolm Thorburn, ‘Proportionate Sentencing and the Rule of Law’ in Lucia Zedner and Julian V 
Roberts (eds), Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew 
Ashworth (2012). 
7 Dubber, ‘Preventative Justice’ (n 4); Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the 
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8 Lindsay Farmer, ‘The Jurisprudence of Security: The Police Power and the Criminal Law’ in Markus Dirk 
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36 
 
2(1) Horizontal Efficiency 
 
The approach of critiquing criminal laws ‘horizontally’ against the internal standards of a 
benchmark, ideal criminal law has been variously criticised,9 including for being a less ‘fruitful’ 
means of analysis than the ‘vertical’ analysis employed in the third part of this chapter.10 However, 
the PSA’s deviation from these normative criminalisation principles deserves consideration, as this 





Harm prevention is among the most fundamental normative tenets of criminalisation,11 and is the 
first subject of this horizontal efficiency evaluation. The first two parts of this analysis are a ‘harm 
reduced’ versus ‘harm caused’ cost-effectiveness evaluation, discussing individual-level harms with 
reference to Feinberg’s harm principle; and collective-level harms with reference to Farmer’s 
conception of ‘securing civil order’. The final part evaluates the theoretical efficiency of the Act’s 
offences against, inter alia, Ashworth and Zedner’s principles of harm-preventing offences. The 
PSA’s overall coherence or dissonance with the theoretical bases discussed throughout this section 
will determine the first aspect of the Act’s horizontal efficiency.  
 
2(1)(a)(i) Harm: Individuals 
 
The harm principle has multiple discrete formulations,12 but Feinberg’s classic definition is that: 
 
[i]t is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably be effective 
in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor and there is 
probably no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost to other values.13 
 
9 Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (2016) 302-3; Arlie 
Loughnan, Self, Others and the State: Relations of Criminal Responsibility (2020) 53. 
10 Dubber, ‘Preventative Justice’ (n 4) 68. 
11 Horder, Ashworth’s Principles (n 5) 22, 54, 57-8. 
12 Victor Tadros, ‘Harm, Sovereignty and Prohibition’ (2011) 17 LEG 35. 
13 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (1984) 26. 
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Feinberg’s harm principle requires more than the pre/post-PSA analysis of NPS-related harms 
expounded in the previous chapter: ‘probably be effective’ implies a baseline understanding of 
(in)effective strategies; ‘no other [equally effective] means’ requires comprehensively analysing 
available evidence and seriously considering alternatives; and his reference to ‘other values’ 
necessitates balanced and proportionate criminalisation with regard to interests including welfare 
and the ‘advancement of … goals like health’.14 Whether the PSA satisfies these requirements and 
efficiently protects individuals from NPS-related harms can be evaluated with Bacchi’s ‘what’s the 
problem represented to be?’ approach.15 
The NPS problem was represented as being high NPS use ‘after years of stable and declining drug 
use’, (i.e. NPS use was represented as a problem in itself); and an exploitative headshop industry 
which circumvented the law and sold unknown drugs, resulting in crime, disorder, and harms 
including fatalities.16 The assumptions underlying this representation were fostered by media 
sensationalism,17 and the established legal approach which associates drugs with crime and 
characterises users in a ‘vulnerability/transgression nexus’ of being simultaneously (and 
conflictingly) non-autonomous and criminally deviant.18  
Left unproblematic in this representation, however, was prohibition itself: the game of cat and 
mouse was regarded by policymakers as a product of legislative form, not substance,19 
notwithstanding the decades-long pedigree of newer and more potent recreational drugs 
appearing in response to prohibitive laws.20 Similarly dismissed were the potential benefits of 
headshops,21 despite their employment of quasi-regulatory harm-reduction frameworks which, 
e.g., often refused underage sales; and there being no conclusive evidence of criminality driving the 
pre-PSA NPS market.22 Users’ inherent vulnerability was accepted as fact with little scrutiny in 
Parliamentary debates and Government reports,23 overlooking the fact that the vast majority of 
drug users are not problem users; and that curiosity, pleasure, ‘psychonautic’ research, improving 
sex, the quality and potency of NPS, and non-detection in standard drug tests were all ‘positive’ 
 
14 ibid 57. 
15 Carol Bacchi, ‘Introducing the “What’s the Problem Represented to Be?” Approach’ in Angelique Blestas 
and Chris Beasley (eds), Engaging with Carol Bacchi: Strategic Interventions and Exchanges (2012). 
16 Explanatory Notes to the PSA, paras 8-13.  
17 1(1)(a). 
18 Kate Brown and Emma Wincup, ‘Producing the Vulnerable Subject in English Drug Policy’ (2020) 80 Int J 
Drug Policy 102525. 
19 Explanatory Notes to the PSA, paras 8, 14, 19, 22; Home Office, ‘News Story’ (n 73, ch 1). 
20 1(2)(a). 
21 Despite the concerns of various legislators, the goal of removing headshops has been pursued since at 
least 2015: HL Deb 9 June 2015, vol 762, cols 735, 745, 760, 762, 769; Home Office, ‘Guidance for Local 
Authorities on Taking Action Against Headshops Selling New Psychoactive Substances’ (2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/action-against-head-shops>. 
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and autonomous motivations for use.24 Expert advice on the framing of the Act and the substances 
it prohibits was (and is still) disregarded in favour of pursuing a widened prohibitive policy,25 and 
Duke argues that ‘NPS have been conveniently scapegoated for more fundamental and systemic 
problems within the prison system [including budget cuts, overcrowding, and lack of purposeful 
activities]’.26 
This representation of the problem effected the PSA, which has achieved a reduction in NPS use. 
However, this reduction was arguably mainly driven by non-problem users, while overall NPS-
related fatalities have increased and harms among vulnerable populations including the homeless 
and incarcerated have been exacerbated.27 The custodial possession offence can further negatively 
affect prisoners’ prospects on release,28 and the Act has perpetuated and extended the MDA’s 
disproportionate police enforcement tactics and sentencing practices against minority groups.29 
Additionally, vulnerable individuals are now threatened by SOC gangs through ‘cuckooing’ and the 
use of children in county lines NPS-trafficking operations.30 
In a nuance of (mis)interpreting the NPS problem, the PSA shifted the balance of the 
vulnerability/transgression nexus apparent in previous UK drug laws from transgression-leaning to 
vulnerability-leaning. The orthodox criminal justice approach to drug users provides only limited 
legislative scope for the provision of treatment.31 However, by rejecting the logic of criminal 
blameworthiness otherwise recognised by the PSA’s custodial possession offence, the focus on all 
NPS users’ perceived vulnerability resulted in the absence of a PSA simple possession offence. While 
consequentially positive – as possession offences often exacerbate harms for end users32 – this 
belies an inaccurate and enduringly negative deontological position. Users are not regarded within 
drug policy as autonomous agents,33 but remain subject to the (recalibrated) 
 
24 1(3)(a) 
25 Expert Panel (n 6, ch 1) 35; Release and Transform, ‘Joint Submission to the Home Affairs Committee’s 
Short Inquiry into the Psychoactive Substances Bill’ (2015) 
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vulnerability/transgression nexus, in which a focus on vulnerability within an overall prohibitive 
framework justifies perpetuating the criminal justice approach. As an illustration, the latest UK 
Drugs Strategy references vulnerability over 20 times and polemically alludes to the need for tough 
enforcement with regards to NPS throughout.34 Similarly, in a recent Parliamentary exchange, a 
question about the failure of current drug policy to protect vulnerable users was answered with a 
statement that enforcement must be ‘pursued vigorously’.35 This is a circularity: the PSA’s inability 
to protect the vulnerable from harm is sanctioning continuing, ineffective prohibition aimed at 
preventing harm to vulnerable people. Similar ‘epistemic bootstrapping’36 justified the PSA’s 
creation: the MDA’s proscription of traditional drugs precipitated the emergence of NPS, and the 
ensuing game of cat and mouse itself legitimised more extensive prohibitive enforcement via a 
blanket ban.37 Circularities can be resolved only with conclusion-distinct evidence, but many of the 
PSA-induced negative changes in the NPS market were readily foreseeable, and instead the PSA has 
crystallised its own justificatory harms.  
 
Bacchi’s ‘what’s the problem represented to be?’ heuristic has shown that the conditions of 
Feinberg’s harm principle are not satisfied with regards to the PSA. Evidence regarding headshops 
and the framing of the Act was not comprehensively analysed and/or dismissed; the welfare of at-
risk groups has been sacrificed for the ‘benefit’ of reduced NPS use among the general, non-
problem NPS using population, for whom the ‘advancement of goals … like health’ was arguably 
unnecessary; and in light of the historical experience of prohibitive drug policies, pursuing a blanket 
ban demonstrates a baseline misunderstanding of (in)effective strategies. 
 
2(1)(a)(ii) Harm: Collective 
 
The ‘vulnerability zeitgeist’38 of recent drug policy extends to various collective interests which were 
threatened by NPS. A broad underlying rationale of the PSA was ‘securing civil order’, defined by 
Farmer as ‘the co-ordination of complex modern societies composed of a range of entities or legal 
persons that are responsible, in a range of different ways, for their own conduct, for the wellbeing 
of others, and for the maintenance of social institutions’.39 This is evident in the PSA’s explicit goals 
 
34 HM Government, 2017 Drug Strategy (2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/drug-
strategy-2017>. 
35 HC Deb 6 February 2020, vol 671, col 480. 
36 Jonathan Vogel, ‘Epistemic Bootstrapping’ (2008) 105(9) J Philos 518. 
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of changing harmful public attitudes towards NPS (which were widely perceived as legal, and thus 
safe, highs) via its expressive function;40 addressing the anti-social behaviour in public spaces 
associated with unregulated headshops;41 and (as an antidote to the MDA’s impotence) reaffirming 
the credibility of prohibitive drug policy via a blanket ban. 
 
The MDA does also have a preventative rationale42 and has been described as ‘a proxy for the 
control of public order’.43 However, the PSA differs from the MDA in the novel preventative ways it 
tries to promote collective interests, reflecting the ‘preventative turn’ in the criminal law whereby 
retributivist desert-based liability has become increasingly superseded by novel legislative 
techniques enabling punishment in the absence of harm.44  
 
A brief sketch of the Act’s preventative nature is required. The PSA created various criminal 
offences: custodial possession of psychoactive substances; breach of PSA-derived civil preventative 
orders (CPO); and the market-related offences of producing, supplying, possessing with intent to 
supply, and importing/exporting psychoactive substances.45 The custodial possession and CPO-
related offences are evidently preventative, i.e., they do not require the causation of harm. 
However, the market offences are also preventative as neither actual nor even a risk of harm is 
required for conviction. While the MDA deems that specific drugs themselves are objectively and 
inherently harmful via the A/B/C harm-classification system, the PSA requires only that the 
substance ‘affects the person’s mental functioning or emotional state’ by ‘stimulating or depressing 
the person’s central nervous system’.46 The blanket ban’s lack of harm distinctions and the inceptive 
direct use of CPOs within drug legislation are the novel preventative aspects of the PSA. 
 
Ramsay argues that citizens have a right to feel secure from the threat of crime and anti-social 
behaviour as subjective insecurity undermines citizens’ ‘vulnerable autonomy’ to participate in 
 
40 Explanatory Notes to the PSA, paras 7, 9, 22; HL Deb 20 January 2016, vol 604, col 1442; Expert Panel (n 6, 
ch 1) 5; Home Office, ‘News Story’ (n 73, ch 1). 
41 Explanatory Notes to the PSA, para 12. 
42 MDA, s 1(2). 
43 Police Foundation, Drugs and the Law: Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971 (2000) 7. 
44 Though it has been argued that ‘claims that prevention constitutes a new departure or paradigm shift 
are, at best, only partially true since today’s preventive endeavours have clear precursors in the eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century origins of the criminal justice system’: Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, 
Preventative Justice (2014) 49. 
45 PSA, ss 4-9, 26-7. 
46 ibid s 2. 
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individual and civic life.47 This echoes the rationale (and militates in favour) of the PSA’s 
preventative offences. However, Tadros argues that ‘we should not make the insecure less secure 
[to] benefit those who are more secure’,48 and Cornford notes a right to subjective security should 
not entail reduced objective security.49 Like the individual-level costs of the PSA, e.g., 
disproportionate police enforcement against minority groups and increased harms among 
homeless people, the Act is also inefficient at this collective level. The perceived threats to citizens’ 
‘vulnerable autonomy’ are out of sight and mind, with the (ostensibly beneficial) effect of removing 
unregulated and disorder-driving headshops from high streets. However, the security of the civil 
order is diminished in real terms with the rise of anonymous, unaccountable and violent SOC 
gangs.50 This increase in NPS-related crime is paradoxically (and parasitically) essential to the 
security and credibility of the prohibitive legal order: reminiscent of the vulnerability-based 
prohibition circularity, NPS-related crime mobilises tougher prohibitive enforcement. Yet, the 
blanket ban’s purpose of restoring credibility to UK drug policy is among the starkest failings of the 
Act, with the game of cat and mouse patently continuing.51  
 
With regards to changing public attitudes, the evidence of PSA-induced displacement suggests the 
Act has (inefficiently) altered attitudes towards NPS at the cost of inversely affecting attitudes 
towards traditional drug use. Moreover, I have previously argued that the semiotics of the PSA’s 
blanket ban of all NPS are intrinsically negative and inappropriate;52 and it has been convincingly 
argued that where harm distinctions are inaccurate or absent:  
 
[t]he most dangerous message of all [is that] all drugs are equally dangerous. When young 
people know from their own experience that part of the message is either exaggerated or 
untrue, there is a serious risk they will discount all the rest.53  
 
Thus, the PSA has been inefficient in preventing harm to the collective interests it sought to protect 
via securing specific aspects of the civil order: ‘disorder-driving’ headshops have been removed, but 
replaced with SOC gangs; all NPS are legislatively controlled, but the emergence of NPS continues 
 
47 Peter Ramsay, The Insecurity State: Vulnerable Autonomy and the Right to Security in the Criminal Law 
(2012) ch 5; Andrew Cornford, ‘Book Review’ (2014) 77(3) MLR 516. 
48 Victor Tadros, ‘Crimes and Security’ (2008) 71(6) MLR 940, 962. 
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ASLR 109. 
53 Police Foundation (n 43) 4. 
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and the derivative threat to the credibility of prohibitive drug laws remains; and while a reduction 
in overall NPS use might reflect changed attitudes towards NPS, the means employed to do so are 
not necessarily appropriate, especially given the displacement from NPS to traditional drugs. 
 
2(1)(a)(iii)(A) Harm: Principled Preventative Criminalisation: Market Offences 
 
Ashworth and Zedner have developed harm-prevention offence categories and preventative 
offence-specific principles of criminalisation. The PSA conforms to a number of these descriptive 
categories to varying degrees. The PSA’s market offences54 are crimes of ‘abstract endangerment’ 
as they require no ‘proof of actual or likely danger’; and they are ‘prophylactic crimes’, i.e., where 
harms ‘arise only after further human interventions’, as the end user of a psychoactive substances 
must themselves ingest the substance – or dealers must engage in some further harmful conduct 
such as exploitation or violence – before harm can occur.55 They also share similarities with ‘pre-
inchoate’ crimes, i.e., ‘[whereas] the properly inchoate offences of attempt, conspiracy and 
encouragement … require proof of an objectively dangerous act … pre-inchoate offences only 
require proof of a subjectively dangerous actor’56 without any ‘need for proof of an intent to cause 
harm’.57 However, although the subjective dangerousness of offenders and substances is 
considered at the sentencing stage, and the offences require no intent to cause harm, the market 
offences are not strictly pre-preparatory in nature. Nonetheless, this overlap between descriptive 
categories enables application of a wider set of Ashworth and Zedner’s principles. 
 
Ashworth and Zedner’s preventative offence principles which are relevant to the PSA58 can broadly 
be grouped into those relating to the offender’s responsibility, and those relating to the 
gravity/triviality of the criminalised conduct.  
The PSA conforms to the first ‘responsibility’ principle, which states that people ‘may be held 
criminally liable for acts [they have] done, on the basis of [potential future acts], only if [they have] 
declared an intent to do those further acts’.59 The offence of possession with intent to supply 
explicitly requires intent; and the intent to distribute psychoactive substances in the offences of 
production and importation are so evidently implied as to also satisfy this principle.  
 
54 Text to n 45. 
55 Ashworth and Zedner (n 44) 102, 111. 
56 Ramsay (n 47) 176-7. 
57 Ashworth and Zedner (n 44) 3.  
58 The principle relating to crimes of ‘concrete endangerment’ is irrelevant to PSA offences.  
59 Ashworth and Zedner (n 44) 112. 
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The second ‘responsibility’ principle, which relates to the offences of supplying and exporting 
psychoactive substances, states that: 
 
A person may fairly be held liable for the future acts of others only if [they have] sufficient 
normative involvement in those acts (e.g. [through encouragement, assistance or 
facilitation]), or where the acts of [others] were foreseeable, with respect to which the 
person has an obligation to prevent a harm that might be caused by the other. 
 
Ashworth and Zedner suggest parent/child relationships exemplify such obligations to prevent 
harm.60 These obligations might legitimately be extended to strangers, e.g., to prevent sales of 
alcohol to heavily drunk persons,61 but common to these obligations is an objective assessment of 
the other person’s lack of autonomy. A blanket ban on sales or exports of psychoactive substances 
to lucid adults illegitimately disregards their autonomy and fails this test. While preventative 
criminalisation may be theoretically appropriate where addicted users are concerned, pragmatic 
considerations of proof militate against criminalisation, as the level of intrusive surveillance into 
individuals’ medical state required to separate addicts from non-addicts would be impractical and 
ethically unacceptable. 
More difficult is what constitutes ‘normative involvement’, as supplying/exporting NPS necessarily 
constitutes ‘facilitation’.62 Simester and von Hirsch tentatively suggest that criminalising the supply 
of potentially harmful products depends on the value and legitimacy of the supplied thing’s 
standard uses, as normative involvement implies ‘a communicative element … such that the 
assistance is not merely happenstance but something [the supplier] endorses and for which [the 
supplier] too is responsible’.63 Suppliers of potentially harmful drugs evidently endorse the use of 
drugs for their psychoactive effects. However, ‘the existence of standard legitimate uses should 
count, in the normal way, against criminalisation’.64 It is submitted that the use of drugs for their 
psychoactive effects is a standard legitimate and valuable use which exists before the law. Fine 
wine, craft beer and malt whisky use is often seen as valuable and legitimate, e.g., during graduation 
 
60 ibid. 
61 Or selling NPS to heavily intoxicated persons; however, some authors regard this as a controversial 
expansion of the harm principle: Jeremy Horder, ‘Harmless Wrongdoing and the Anticipatory Perspective 
on Criminalisation’ in GR Sullivan and I Dennis (eds), Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of 
Criminal Harms (2012). 
62 AP Simester and Andrew von Hirsch, ‘Remote Harms and Non-Constitutive Crimes’ (2009) 28(1) Crim 
Justice Ethics 89, 100. 
63 ibid 100-1. 
64 ibid 101. 
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celebrations; the use of poppers is similarly regarded by many;65 and even the use of SCRAs, 
perhaps the most harmful NPS, is probably regarded as valuable and legitimate to the vast (non-
problem) majority66 of users. However, alcohol use would be prohibited by the PSA if not for the 
arbitrary67 exemption; recent judicial decisions indicate poppers are illegal under the Act;68 and 
SCRA emergence was among the Act’s main justifications.69 I am not suggesting that NPS should be 
uncontrolled,70 but the principle of requiring the state to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt 
before determining criminality ought to preclude the Act’s blanket criminalisation of supplying any 
psychoactive substance,71 as drugs can be supplied for legitimate (and harmless) standard uses. 
Especially so, given the force of criminal sanctions, which (to state briefly) are ‘a morally loaded 
sledgehammer’72 and ‘the most powerful weapon in the state arsenal’.73 
 
The first principle relating to the gravity/triviality of the criminalised conduct states that ‘the more 
remote the conduct criminalized is from the harm-to-be-prevented, and the less grave that harm, 
the weaker is the case for criminalization’.74 The potential harms of some NPS are grave, but in 
stipulating no harm-to-be-prevented via a blanket ban of all substances which affect mental 
functioning or emotional state, ‘the potential for abuse, for over-extension into the innocent lives 
of citizens increases dramatically’,75 making the offences arguably too broad to satisfy this principle. 
Similarly, Ashworth and Zedner posit that preventative offences should ‘require the court to 
adjudicate on the particular wrong targeted, and not on some broader conduct’; and criminalisation 
of abstract endangerment must focus only ‘on those instances where there is a significant risk of 
serious harm’ with ‘regulatory or administrative measures [applied] to deal with lesser risks of 
harm’.76 As the market offences arbitrarily require courts to adjudicate on the substance’s ability to 
affect mental functioning or emotional states instead of harm, are imprecise by design, and 
preclude the use of regulatory or administrative measures to deal with low-risk NPS, these 
 
65 ‘Poppers Should Not Be Banned Until the Evidence is Reviewed’ (Stonewall, 20 January 2016) 
<https://www.stonewall.org.uk/cy/node/21898>; HC Deb 20 January 2016, vol 604, col 1456.  
66 BMA (n 163, ch 1). 
67 Beatrice Brunhöber, ‘Drug Offenses’ in Markus D Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Criminal Law (2014). 
68 Rochester [2018] EWCA Crim 1819; 2(2)(a)(ii). 
69 1(2)(a)(ii). 
70 See discussion at 2(3)(d)-(e). 
71 For discussions of this principle in the context of framing drug laws, see: Husak, Overcriminalization (n 32) 
52; Brunhöber (n 67). 
72 AP Simester and Andrew von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation 
(2011) 10. 
73 Douglas Husak, ‘Reservations about Overcriminalization’ (2011) 14(1) New Crim LR 97, 102. 
74 Ashworth and Zedner (n 44) 112. 
75 AP Simester, ‘Prophylactic Crimes’ in Sullivan and Dennis (n 61). 
76 Ashworth and Zedner (n 44) 114, 116. 
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principles are also unsatisfied and indicate the PSA’s use of preventative criminalisation is 
inefficient. 
 
2(1)(a)(iii)(B) Harm: Principled Preventative Criminalisation: CPOs  
 
The PSA provides for the creation of civil preventative orders (CPO). Kelly has recently elucidated 
why ‘hybrid’ CPOs (which the PSA CPOs are examples of) are objectionable in principle.77 Firstly, 
they are coercive, i.e., they create restrictions backed by the threat of imprisonment, ‘but their 
imposition is often left as a matter of judicial decision-making as opposed to risk assessment with 
appropriate safeguards’.78 Secondly, they are punitive: they relate to already-illegal behaviours, i.e., 
other PSA offences; they operate similarly to accepted punishments, e.g., suspended sentences; 
and they have a punitive purpose of characterising/stigmatising the subject as requiring restraint 
from committing PSA offences.79 However, ‘their imposition is not preceded by the heightened 
criminal fair trial safeguards’.80 
Under these frameworks, courts can impose prohibition and/or premises orders – preventing 
persons carrying out non-criminal activities or requiring persons to take reasonable steps to prevent 
such activities in designated places – where the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities 
that either the person is likely to commit, assist or encourage a PSA market offence, or has not 
complied with a preceding prohibition/premises notice.81 Orders must be ‘necessary and 
proportionate’ and can be imposed either after conviction for a PSA offence or following application 
by a listed authority, e.g., a chief officer of police.82 Orders have an indefinite duration (except 
where the person is under 18) and breach without a reasonable excuse is punishable by up to two 
years’ imprisonment.83  
Although PSA CPOs have not been widely used, ‘issues of principle remain important’.84 Parallels 
can be drawn with the ‘talisman’ of CPOs, the anti-social behaviour order (ASBO).85 Both are civil 
orders, breach of which is a criminal offence, and can be criticised for taking no account of the 
person’s intention to engage in the overall harm-to-be-prevented by the order; for disallowing a 
 
77 Rory James Kelly, ‘Behaviour Orders: Preventative and/or Punitive Measures?’ (PhD thesis, University of 
Oxford 2019) 228. 
78 ibid 221, 229. 
79 ibid 222, 224. 
80 ibid 229. 
81 PSA, ss 12-14, 17-18, 20, 22. Prohibition/premises notices can be issued by senior police officers and local 
authorities, but their breach is not an offence. 
82 PSA, ss 13-14, 18-21. 
83 ibid ss 18-19, 26. 
84 Ashworth and Zedner (n 44) 83. 
85 ibid 78. 
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locus poenitentiae, i.e., an opportunity for the person to change their mind; and for creating 
personalised criminal laws.86 However, whereas (at least in England) ASBO applications were 
decided on the criminal standard of proof,87 PSA CPOs require only the civil standard, which is 
concerning as ‘the criminal standard of proof is one of the major safeguards against epistemic error 
[and] miscarriage of justice’.88 Additionally, the reverse-burden ‘reasonable excuse’ defence per the 
Act’s wording is objectionable for being unclear, as judicial precedent provides no definite answer 
as to whether the burden is evidential or persuasive.89 Furthermore, the PSA CPOs conflict with 
some of Ashworth and Zedner’s suggested CPO principles, including that CPOs ‘should only be 
instituted … after conviction’ to ensure legitimacy via a concrete basis (i.e., past offending rather 
than ‘likelihood’) for preventing future acts; and that if CPOs are not created following a criminal 
conviction and on a lower standard of proof, they should be wholly regulatory measures with lower, 
non-custodial penalties for breach.90  
 
2(1)(a)(iv) Harm: Conclusion 
 
The PSA was created to prevent harm to various individual- and collective-level interests. With 
reference to Feinberg’s harm principle and Farmer’s conception of securing civil order, a ‘harm 
reduced’ versus ‘harm caused’ efficiency evaluation was undertaken: despite some benefits, e.g., 
reducing NPS use in the general population and removing headshops, the Act has not been cost-
effective, as, inter alia, NPS-related harms to vulnerable populations have been exacerbated and 
the NPS market is now dominated by SOC organisations. Though some of the PSA’s market offences 
do conform to Ashworth and Zedner’s harm-preventing offence principle of requiring intent, the 
Act’s blanket ban sacrifices other principles of preventative criminalisation; and conflicts with the 
general principle of requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt before determining criminality. 
Moreover, the Act’s CPOs are objectionable due to their high maximum sentences; potentially 
persuasive reverse burden clauses; and watered-down fair criminal trial safeguards. Thus, the PSA’s 
horizontal efficiency – i.e., its coherence with normative principles of the criminal law – is deficient 
across multiple theoretical bases insofar as advancing the criminal law’s aim of preventing harm. 
 
 
86 ibid 84-5. 
87 R (McCann) v Manchester Crown Court [2003] 1 Cr App R 27. 
88 Ian Dennis, ‘Security, Risk and Preventative Orders’ in Sullivan and Dennis (n 61). 
89 Eamon Keane and Fraser Davidson (eds), Raitt on Evidence: Principles, Policy and Practice (3rd edn, 2018) 
paras 5-25 to 5-48. 





The view that conduct should be criminalised only if it is morally wrongful as a matter of normative 
principle is ubiquitous, though not universal.91 Whether the use, possession or sale of drugs 
generally is wrongful has sparked extensive discussion, though Husak convincingly argues that 
‘arguments for the alleged immorality of drug use almost never are produced; this judgement is 
typically put forward as a kind of brute moral fact or incontrovertible moral intuition’.92 Limitations 
of space preclude such general analyses here, but wrongfulness in the specific context of NPS and 
the PSA will be briefly sketched and commented on. 
Certain instances of NPS sales ought to be criminalised for being morally wrongful, independent of 
purely harm-based considerations. The sale of NPS to children or the use of children as NPS 
couriers93 is morally wrongful as children lack the ‘developmental maturity fully to understand, and 
evaluatively to distinguish, between choices they can or must make in life’;94 and the sale of impure 
and/or mislabelled NPS is wrongful as this denies the buyer the requisite fair opportunity and 
capacity to make an informed choice about ingesting a particular product, whether or not harm 
results. These two moral wrongs, i.e., the sale of NPS to children and the (intentional) mislabelling 
of NPS as ‘plant fertiliser’ and ‘bath salts’ (to circumvent trading standards and medicines laws), 
were widespread pre-PSA.95 Furthermore, as the UK NPS trade approached the event horizon of 
the PSA’s enactment, many retailers abandoned their responsible practices, e.g., with ‘fire sales’ of 
heavily-discounted stock.96 However, these examples of specific moral wrongs do not imply that 
selling NPS is wrongful per se. Thus, while the PSA does legitimately criminalise some morally 
wrongful conduct, it does so inefficiently, by also proscribing non-wrongful conduct, e.g., the sale 
of NPS to autonomous adults.97 Moreover, as argued later in this chapter,98 the Act’s efficiency in 
relation to proscribing wrongful conduct is further impaired by the existence of (more cost-
effective) potential approaches that could regulate these specific wrongs without criminalising non-
wrongful conduct. 
Arguably, selling NPS post-PSA is wrongful as this involves tacit endorsement of the violent and 
exploitative SOC-led NPS market.99 This view has provided a moral basis for maintaining a criminal 
 
91 Andrew Cornford, ‘Rethinking the Wrongness Constraint on Criminalisation’ (2017) 36 Law Philos 615. 
92 Husak, Overcriminalization (n 32) 151. 
93 PSA, s 6 provides that using children as couriers is an aggravation. 
94 Horder, Ashworth’s Principles (n 5) 71. 
95 1(1)(a). 
96 1(1)(c). 
97 For comprehensive general discussions which reach similar conclusions, see: Paul Smith, ‘Drugs, Morality 
and the Law’ (2002) 19(3) J Appl Philos 233; Rob Lovering, A Moral Defense of Recreational Drug Use (2015). 
98 2(3)(c)-(e). 
99 A similar argument is found in: Peter Alldridge, Relocating Criminal Law (2000) ch 7. 
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justice approach to NPS.100 However, this is another example of the circular justificatory leitmotif 
discussed previously in relation to preventing harm: participating in the NPS market would not be 
wrongful on this rationale but for the PSA’s prior criminalisation of NPS, as there was no evidence 
of SOC organisations driving the pre-PSA NPS market.101  
 
Though limited by space, this short discussion demonstrates the PSA’s dissonance with another 


























2(1)(c) Fair Labelling 
 
Fair labelling, i.e. ‘that offences are subdivided and labelled so as to represent fairly the nature and 
magnitude of the law-breaking’102 is an ‘entirely unobjectionable’103 principle in criminal law, but 
one with which the PSA conflicts. 
 
The PSA’s broad definitions enable the conviction, and thereby condemnation, of those who sell 
drugs where the MDA’s narrow definitions do not. However, condemnation is beneficial only 
insofar as it is accurately represented and dispensed; otherwise, the risk of significant costs is 
entailed.104 The PSA’s definitions create numerous such risks, as the blanket ban accords everyone 
convicted under the Act for supplying105 NPS the same label, i.e. that of ‘supplying a psychoactive 
substance’, regardless of the harmfulness or volume (or any other measure of the ‘magnitude of 
the law-breaking’) of the specific NPS supplied. For example, the severity of previous convictions 
for drug-related offences is a determining factor in security vetting for public106 and private107 sector 
jobs, and is judged with reference to the label dispensed on conviction. However, those convicted 
for a low-level PSA offence may be refused employment where someone convicted of a Class C (i.e. 
low-level) MDA offence might be successful, as severity judgements for PSA convictions cannot be 
made due to the absence of a harm/offence-seriousness categorisation framework. Although the 
severity of sentences imposed for previous convictions is also used in pre-employment screening,108 
this alone cannot ameliorate the PSA’s absence of accurate condemnatory labels ‘[as sentences 
may be] substantially aggravated or mitigated as a result of factors which are unrelated to and tell 
us nothing about the offence itself or the offender’s culpability’.109 Inversely, however, accurate 
condemnatory labels are necessary for proportionate sentencing, and the PSA’s lack of such labels 
has precipitated arbitrary sentencing.110 
 
102 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th edn, 2006) 88. 
103 James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, ‘Fair Labelling in Criminal Law’ (2008) 71(2) MLR 217, 246. 
104 ibid 226. 
105 Or any other offence created by the Act. 
106 ‘Appendix: Security Vetting and Procedures of Not Directly Employed Workers in Prisons’ 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2155
21/dh_128595.pdf>. 
107 See e.g., Nacro, ‘Employing Someone with a Criminal Record’ <https://www.nacro.org.uk/resettlement-
advice-service/support-for-employers/employing-someone-with-a-criminal-record/#suitable>. 
108 The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, s 5 dictates when convictions become ‘spent’, based on the 
sentence severity. ‘Spent’ convictions are not included on certain pre-employment background checks: 
‘Convictions and Higher Level Disclosures’ (22 October 2019) <https://www.mygov.scot/convictions-higher-
disclosures/>. 
109 Chalmers and Leverick (n 103) 223. 




Moreover, Tadros argues that fair labelling is essential for the promotion of social justice, which as 
he advocates, is: 
 
that the set of rules that the state enforces are guided by respect for autonomous agents, 
and the protection and promotion of their interests [and] to ensure that each citizen of the 
state has confidence both that this is the case and that all are abiding by that public set of 
rules.111 
 
Tadros states that the condemnatory function of the criminal law (exercised via fair labelling) 
‘[reaffirms] a public commitment to ensure trust and confidence that a public scheme of justice is 
adhered to’, but this ‘can be developed only if … interests are adequately reflected in the scheme 
of laws’.112 On Tadros’ understanding, inherent in the principle of fair labelling are requirements of 
constructive and rational debate in the creation of legislation, public consensus as to the law’s 
moral basis, and public confidence of the law’s place within wider policy.113  
 
The rationales employed in the PSA’s creation were often deficient: it was based on the Irish 
equivalent,114 but ‘no formal evaluation of the impact of the [Irish] legislation [was] undertaken’.115 
The ACMD recommended numerous changes to the Bill, including defining a ‘psychoactive 
substance’ in scientific, rather than lay terms, but this advice was disregarded as it was ‘[not] the 
Government’s intentions’.116 The concerns of the pressure groups Release and Transform regarding 
the Psychoactive Substances Bill’s legal certainty were also ignored,117 and, moreover, the 
predictive potential of past experiences with prohibitive legislation was largely overlooked.118 In 
Tadros’ words, such ‘impoverished level of consultation and debate [undermines] the confidence 
that citizens can have … eroding the sense that the criminal law imposes proper limits on our 
 
111 Victor Tadros, ‘Fair Labelling and Social Solidarity’ in Zedner and Roberts (n 6). 
112 ibid. 
113 ibid. 
114 Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010 (Ireland). 
115 Expert Panel (n 6, ch 1) 35. 
116 ACMD, ‘ACMD’s Final Advice on Definitions for Psychoactive Substances Bill’ (2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470421/ACMD_definitio
ns_advice_final-23-October-2015.pdf>. 
117 Release and Transform (n 25) 4. 
118 E.g., the ‘iron law of prohibition’ and historical emergence of new drugs: 1(2)(a)-(b). 
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conduct as part of a shared project of advancing our interests and ensuring respect for our 
independence’.119 
 
Following the UK-wide June 2020 anti-racism protests,120 the UK Government announced the 
creation of the Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities, with the aim of examining the ‘priority 
area’ of criminal justice.121 The PSA, and wider prohibitive drug policy, has contributed to racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system.122 In conjunction with the recently reignited public 
discourse on racism, this might stimulate public demand for new approaches to drugs; and suggests 
that the PSA is regressing rather than advancing Tadros’ social justice-seeking view of fair labelling, 
as the interests of certain demographics are not ‘adequately reflected in the scheme of laws’. 
Furthermore, a recent Scottish Affairs Committee Report concluded that ‘the UK Government must 
immediately review the exemption of substance dependence from equality legislation and assess 
the impact it has on people who use drugs’, signalling that current drug policies are not only 
regarded as objectionable for being criminal justice- rather than health-based, but also on social 
justice grounds.123 
 
The PSA’s dissonance with the requirements of fair labelling concludes this evaluation of the Act’s 
horizontal efficiency. In its blanket criminalisation of NPS, the PSA has sacrificed multiple principles 
of criminalisation, including harm prevention (in the context of three theoretical bases); the 
proscription of moral wrongdoing; and fair labelling, and is therefore an inefficient statute when 








119 Tadros, ‘Fair Labelling’ (n 111). 
120 ‘George Floyd Death: Thousands Turn Out for UK Anti-Racism Protests’ BBC News (2 June 2020) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-52949014>. 
121 ‘News Story: Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities’ (16 July 2020) 
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2(2) Diagonal Efficiency 
 
Formalist requirements of the rule of law such as maximum legal certainty have been posited as 
fundamental principles of the criminal law, akin to harmfulness, wrongfulness and fair labelling.124 
The following ‘diagonal’ analysis of the PSA’s adherence to formalist requirements of the rule of 
law considers the area of overlap between the horizontal and vertical critiques of the Act’s 
efficiency: harmony with the formalist requirements would both indicate a dimension of horizontal 
efficiency – as the PSA’s effects would not be at the cost of these normative principles of 
criminalisation – and also suggest that PSA is an efficient example of functionalist rule of law-based 
‘vertical’ governance.  
 
2(2)(a) Maximum Legal Certainty 
 
The rule of law-based125 principle of maximum legal certainty requires that ‘the law must be 
adequately accessible: the citizen … must be able (if need be with appropriate advice) to foresee, 
to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail’.126 However, the scope of laws on drugs not controlled by the MDA has been uncertain for 
decades, and the PSA has exacerbated this problem via its blanket ban. 
 
2(2)(a)(i) Pre-PSA Legal Uncertainty 
 
A 1984 Scottish case applied the general offence of reckless endangerment/injury to the supply of 
potentially toxic substances to children,127 followed soon after by an equivalent English statutory 
offence.128 However, a later Scottish case dispelled any implied requirements of supplying the 
substances to children,129 potentially extending the offence to supplying NPS, an uncertainty not 
shared by the English legislation.130 Also uncertain was whether trading standards and medicines 
 
124 Horder, Ashworth’s Principles (n 5) 59. 
125 Ibid 83. 
126 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245 [49]. 
127 Khaliq v HM Advocate 1984 JC 23. 
128 Intoxicating Substances (Supply) Act 1985. 
129 Ulhaq v HM Advocate 1991 SLT 614. 
130 Timothy H Jones and Ian Taggart, Criminal Law (7th edn, 2018) para 9-45. 
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regulations could be used to target NPS; these were largely unsuccessful, so the PSA was created 
to replace the English statute with a new, UK-wide framework.131  
Concerns about the legislation were numerous.132 The ACMD stated that the final definition of a 
‘psychoactive substance’ was ‘unnecessarily broad’,133 and the Academy of Medical Sciences 
expressed unease over the Act’s potential to affect medical research.134 Additionally, the definition 
does not distinguish direct or indirect psychoactive effects, so poppers were thought (and 
intended)135 to be captured until outcry precipitated the ACMD’s ‘consensus view’ statement that 
the Act did not capture substances with ‘peripheral’, indirect effects on the central nervous 
system.136 Moreover, the Act could be construed to prohibit nutmeg (of which five grams can cause 
‘euphoria, giddiness … detachment, confabulation and hallucinations’)137 despite the exemption for 
foodstuffs.138 
 
2(2)(a)(ii) Post-PSA Legislative Construction 
 
Maximum legal certainty is not absolute certainty, but ‘the use of vague terms should be reinforced 
by other definitional elements, guidelines or illustrative examples’.139 There are some (less vague) 
definitional elements in the PSA. The legislature responded to the concerns of the Academy of 
Medical Sciences by including exemptions to prohibited activities for medical professionals and 
researchers in the Act.140 Although terms such as ‘approved scientific research’, ‘ethics review body’ 
and ‘charities’ are defined with reference to existing legislation, these exemptions have not been 
effective as the PSA’s broad wording has nonetheless (inefficiently) obstructed medical and 
industrial research.141 Guidelines for interpreting the PSA do exist, such as the ACMD’s advice on 
 
131 1(1)(a); PSA, sch 5; Though following Quinn v Cunningham 1956 JC 22, the potential Scottish offence of 
selling whisky to alcoholics remains. 
132 Release and Transform (n 25). 
133 ACMD, ‘ACMD Advice on Definitions of Scope for the “Psychoactive Substances Bill”’ (2015) 4 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4540
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135 Psychoactive Substances Bill Deb 27 October 2015, cols 37-8. 
136 ACMD, ‘ACMD Review of Alkyl Nitrites (“Poppers”)’ (2016) 3 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/5081
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138 Burgess (n 52) 112. 
139 Horder, Ashworth’s Principles (n 5) 84. 




poppers, but these are not law. In Rochester142 the appellant sought to rely on the ACMD’s 
‘consensus view’ that indirect effects on the CNS are not ‘psychoactive’ in his appeal against 
conviction for selling nitrous oxide. Previously, the Court of Appeal had used an ACMD letter143 and 
a Home Affairs Select Committee Report144 when considering the harms and applicability of nitrous 
oxide to the PSA, but the Rochester court dismissed the appeal, stating the ACMD’s view and its 
ministerial acceptance ‘was not an admissible aid to construction’, and made clear that an ‘indirect 
effect was sufficient’ given the lack of a direct/indirect distinction in the PSA.145 As Fortson 
highlights, this again casts doubt on the legality of poppers, which can now only satisfactorily be 
resolved with a specific exemption.146  
The executive has provided illustrative examples to clarify the PSA’s vague definition of a 
‘psychoactive substance’, but these have arguably further confused the already-complex legislative 
and judicial definitional patchwork. The Act’s explanatory notes state that nutmeg is an exempted 
substance because its ‘psychoactive effect is negligible’.147 However, the Home Office’s guidance 
for retailers states that the ‘psychoactive effects’ with which the PSA is concerned include 
‘hallucinations; changes in alertness; perception of time and space; mood or empathy with others; 
and drowsiness’.148 As mentioned above, all these effects can be associated with nutmeg 
intoxication, and following the literal legislative construction in Rochester, courts may be 
unpersuaded by the explanatory notes’ stipulation that nutmeg’s psychoactivity is ‘negligible’.149 
The illegality of selling nutmeg for its psychoactive effect has not been judicially tested, so this 
criticism might appear merely theoretical. However, prior to Rochester the courts struggled with 
the Act’s application to nitrous oxide: two 2017 prosecutions collapsed when the defence 
successfully argued that nitrous oxide was an exempted medicinal product.150 This was widely 
reported in the media,151 and, until the court in Chapman ruled otherwise a few months later in 
October 2017,152 this appeared to be the legal position. During this period, in September 2017, 
Daniel Halpin was found selling nitrous oxide in ‘a mistaken though honestly held belief that nitrous 
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oxide was not regarded as a psychoactive substance … based on news coverage [of the collapsed 
trials]’.153 He was convicted following a late guilty plea in August 2018. Ignorance of the law is no 
defence,154 and neither the non-binding Crown Court decisions nor the associated media reports 
are grounds for strict legislative construction in favour of the accused. However, Halpin 
demonstrates the practical ramifications and costs of the PSA’s definitional legal uncertainty.  
Horder notes that modern decisions treat the principle that ‘a penal statute falls to be construed 
with a degree of strictness in favour of the accused’155 merely ‘permissively’.156 This was evident in 
Rochester where the court decided that no such ‘canon of construction [could] assist the 
defendant’.157 Similarly, courts may decide the PSA’s lack of legal certainty is offset by the principle 
that ‘those who skate on thin ice can hardly expect to find a sign [denoting] the precise spot where 
they may fall in’.158 As discussed above, though, the costs of the PSA’s uncertainty extend to beyond 
those who sell nitrous oxide-filled balloons for ephemeral highs. The wide public-interest discretion 
of UK prosecutors159 might be the only protection for those who have been unwillingly and 
unjustifiably placed on thin ice, e.g., medical/industrial researchers and those who sell poppers, 
and for whom legislative, judicial and executive attempts to limit the scope of the PSA have failed. 
Such discretionary protection, however, ‘unchecked and unbalanced by other branches of 










153 Halpin [2019] EWCA Crim 892 [5]. 
154 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid It’ (2011) 74(1) MLR 1. 
155 Hughes [2013] 1 WLR 2461 [26]. 
156 Horder, Ashworth’s Principles (n 5) 88. 
157 Rochester (n 68) [23]. 
158 Knuller v DPP [1973] AC 435, 463. 
159 CPS, ‘The Code for Crown Prosecutors’ (26 October 2018) 4.9 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors>; COPFS, ‘Prosecution Code’ (2018) 6 
<https://www.copfs.gov.uk/images/Documents/Prosecution_Policy_Guidance/Prosecution20Code20_Final
20180412__1.pdf>. 
160 Husak, Overcriminalization (n 32) 27. 
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2(2)(b) Proportionate Sentencing 
 
Thorburn argues that ‘state officials are the only ones with jurisdiction to administer criminal justice 
[and] that the terms of their jurisdiction impose further limits on how they may act when 
administering criminal punishment’.161 These limits are the ‘basic requirements of the rule of law 
[which] means … refraining from arbitrariness in the exercise of public power’.162 Such framing of 
‘the role of criminal sentencing within a larger constitutional order’163 necessitates non-arbitrary, 
proportionate sentencing. Thorburn defines ‘proportionality’ with reference to Ashworth and von 
Hirsch’s principles of: parity (offenders who commit equally serious crimes should be punished 
equally severely); rank-ordering (sentences should be more/less severe for more/less serious 
crimes respectively); and spacing (sentences should be proportionately severe in proportion to the 
degree of seriousness of the offence).164  
Overlap between the above criticisms of the Act’s legal certainty and of the following analysis of 
PSA offence sentencing is inevitable. The blanket ban gives judges no guidance on linking 
punishment-severity with offence-seriousness, unlike the MDA’s ‘legally certain’ A/B/C harm-
classification system. As Ashworth and von Hirsch note, maximum sentences can ‘[give] 
proportionality of sentencing only a peripheral role’.165 This difficulty is compounded by the 
sentencing guidance for NPS which, like the ‘defining elements, guidelines or illustrative examples’ 
regarding the Act’s definition of psychoactivity, is obscure/contradictory, unauthoritative166 and 




The limitations of the following analysis include Walker’s ‘rickety ladder’:167 if optimally 
proportionate sentencing under the PSA is where links can be drawn between the (‘ladder-like’) 
spectrums of crime-seriousness and punishment-severity ‘without disturbing the ordinal order of 
 
161 Thorburn (n 6). 
162 ibid. 
163 ibid. 
164 Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (2005) 139-
40. 
165 ibid 131. 
166 ‘This guidance does not carry the same authority as a sentencing guideline, and sentencers are not 
obliged to follow it’: Sentencing Council, ‘Sentencing of Drug Offences Involving Newer and Less Common 
Drugs’ (2018) <https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/news/item/sentencing-of-drug-offences-involving-
newer-and-less-common-drugs/>. 
167 Nigel Walker, Why Punish? (1991) 102. 
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either scale’ (i.e. ‘the “rungs” of the central “ladder” linking crime-seriousness and punishment-
severity must never cross’),168 then the various sub-gradations within each scale will render a 
comparative benchmark of optimal proportionality elusive. For example, crime-seriousness in the 
PSA is not a linear, ‘ladder-like’ spectrum, but depends on multiple elements including: the highly 
variable relative harmfulness of the innumerable substances proscribed by the Act; the size and 
sophistication of the illicit operation; and the circumstances in which those substances were sold 
and to whom. Similarly, punishment-severity in PSA cases depends not just on crime-seriousness, 
but also the offender’s criminal record, the timing of guilty pleas and the sentencing totality 
principle, i.e., ‘it is usually impossible to arrive at a just and proportionate sentence for multiple 
offending simply by adding together notional single sentences’.169 This makes identification of PSA-
specific sentences difficult where judges have not fully explained their working in cases with 
multiple charges. Furthermore, as Bottoms highlights, comparing the relative punishment-severity 
of fines, community payback orders, court-ordered rehabilitation, and both suspended and 
immediate custodial sentences presents ‘a significant number of difficulties’.170 Finally, the small 
number of reported cases and limitations of space preclude a systematic analysis of sentencing in 
all PSA cases, so implausibility deriving from anecdotalism is a risk.171 However, these limitations 
can largely be mitigated by grouping cases by substance, circumstances and operational 
sophistication in considering crime-seriousness; and taking a primarily binary view of 
custodial/non-custodial sentences in considering punishment-severity. Additionally, PSA-specific 
sentences are estimated where judicial working-out is unclear, and to reduce anecdotalism 
numerous cases (with both disproportionate and ‘settled’ sentences) gleaned from various sources 








168 Anthony Bottoms, ‘Five Puzzles in von Hirsch’s Theory of Punishment’ in Andrew Ashworth and Martin 
Wasik (eds), Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory: Essays in Honour of Andrew von Hirsch (1998). 
169 Sentencing Council, ‘Offences Taken into Consideration and Totality: Definitive Guideline’ (2012) 5 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Offences-Taken-into-Consideration-and-
Totality-definitive-guideline-Web.pdf>. 
170 Bottoms (n 168). 








Figure 1 (above) demonstrates the disproportionality of sentencing for the sale of nitrous oxide at 
music festivals. William Cook was sentenced to 42 months’ custody – similar to the 2017 England 
and Wales average of 45 months for supplying a Class A drug172 – for selling ‘hundreds’ of nitrous 
oxide canisters at the 2016 Electric Daisy Carnival.173 Given the relative harmlessness174 of nitrous 
oxide compared to, e.g. heroin,175 this sentence conflicts with all three principles of parity, rank-
ordering and spacing. By contrast, Kirk Rochester was given just 2 months for intent to supply 165 
similar canisters of nitrous oxide just a week later at the 2016 Love Box Festival,176 and Nicholas 
Chroussis avoided custody with a 6-month suspended sentence and 150 hours of unpaid work for 
245 canisters at the September 2016 Boundary Festival:177 limitations recognised, there appears to 
 
172 HOR (n 2, ch 1) 27. 
173 Home Office and Sarah Newton, ‘Press Release: Psychoactive Substances Ban 6 Months On: Almost 500 
Arrests and First Convictions’ (29 December 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/psychoactive-
substances-ban-6-months-on-almost-500-arrests-and-first-convictions>. The exact number of canisters is 
unknown: 500 has been graphically represented as an approximation. 
174 ACMD, ‘ACMD Advice on Nitrous Oxide Abuse’ (2015) 4 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/409403/acmd-advice-
on-nitrous-oxide.doc>.  
175 A Class A substance: MDA, sch 2. 
176 Rochester (n 68). 
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be no parity among these three cases which involved similar numbers of identical canisters in 
similar settings over just three months. 
Despite the clarification of nitrous oxide’s legal status following Rochester’s unsuccessful appeal,178 
sentencing for supplying nitrous oxide at festivals remained unpredictable. The trial judge in 
Halpin179 referenced Bush180 which stated that: 
 
the circumstances of this offending … constitute a significant aggravating factor. Summer 
music festivals in the UK are an increasingly important part of the popular culture … Very 
often it is the first time [teenagers] have been away from direct parental control. They are 
particularly vulnerable to those trying to sell them drugs. Anyone who is involved in such 
an enterprise, even on a relatively low-level basis … must expect an immediate custodial 
sentence.181 
 
Halpin was caught with 1707 canisters (more than Cook, Rochester and Chroussis combined) at the 
2017 Lockdown Festival, but had his suspended sentence reduced from 12 to 11 months on 
appeal.182 Despite the remarks in Bush, the courts appeared reluctant to impose immediate 
custodial sentences in festival nitrous oxide cases post-Chroussis: Jahvani Speede-Thomas received 
a (significant but non-custodial) 6-month suspended sentence, 10 days rehabilitation, 180 hours of 
unpaid work and a £425 fine for having 100 canisters at the 2018 Farr Festival.183 However, when 
sentencing Rahib Miah to 15 months (reduced to 9 on appeal)184 immediate custody after being 
caught with 95 canisters – the lowest quantity of all – at the 2018 Kendal Calling Festival, the judge 
stated that ‘there has to be a sentence that tells people that in this county and at this festival (which 
is fast coming upon us) that drug-dealing will not be tolerated’.185 Such wide and seemingly arbitrary 
deviation in punishment-severity in these cases is inconsistent with the rule of law-based principle 
of proportionate sentencing as there was comparatively little deviation in crime-seriousness. All 
these cases involved the same substance and occurred at music festivals. Furthermore, the size and 
 
178 Rochester (n 68). 
179 Halpin (n 153). 
180 Bush [2013] EWCA Crim 1164. 
181 ibid [12]. 
182 Halpin (n 153) [2].  
183 Hertfordshire Constabulary, ‘Man Sentenced for Selling Laughing Gas’ (14 May 2019) 
<https://www.herts.police.uk/news-and-appeals/man-sentenced-for-selling-laughing-gas-0215g>.  
184 Miah [2019] EWCA Crim 1476. 




sophistication of the operations were similar, with relatively modest (compared to the non-festival 




Figure 2 (above) shows sentencing in nitrous oxide sentences outside music festival settings is even 
less proportionate. Deividas Grigas received a 24-month suspended sentence on appeal for supply 
and possession with intent to supply a total of 4536 canisters.186 This totals more canisters than in 
all the previously discussed cases combined, yet Grigas avoided immediate custody, unlike Cook, 
Rochester and Miah.  
Sonny Chapman was given 28 months immediate custody for intent to supply over 14 thousand 
nitrous oxide canisters, handling stolen goods and custody of one counterfeit currency note.187 A 
breakdown of sentencing or the seriousness (i.e., summary or indictment) of each charge is 
unavailable, but on summary conviction the maximum sentences for the latter two offences are 
three188 and six189 months respectively. This suggests Chapman’s sentence for supplying nitrous 
oxide may have been at least 19 months,190 though the aforementioned sentencing totality 
principle may render this estimate inaccurate. However, Zubair Iftikhar avoided prison with a 10-
month suspended sentence and 220 hours of unpaid work for intent to supply nearly 48 thousand 
 
186 This sentence also took into account the offender’s Class A drug dealing: Grigas (n 143) [4]. 
187 Chapman (n 144). 
188 Magistrate’s Courts Act 1980, s 33(1)(a). 
189 Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, s 22(1)(a)(ii). 
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canisters. This is nearly 3½ times more canisters than Chapman and over 10 times more than 
Grigas,191 but attracted the most lenient sentence of all three cases. Similarly, Siavash Taheri 
received a 9-month suspended sentence for over 36 thousand canisters.192 Both Iftikhar and Taheri 
were selling nitrous oxide to students, for many of whom going to university may be the first time 
away from direct parental control, but neither the comments in Bush nor the comparatively vast 
quantity of canisters appear to have been influential. Conversely, Kamren Gay’s 8-month 
suspended sentence and 200 hours of unpaid work is only marginally more lenient than Iftikhar and 
Taheri’s, yet Gay was given this for just 360 canisters.193 
Ashworth and von Hirsch argue that exemplary punishments – like those of Cook and Miah – make 
proportionality ‘lose its status as an independent ethical requirement and remain subject to 
whatever dilutions appear to be needed in the name of crime control’.194 These harsh sentences 
also highlight a methodological flaw in the HOR, which states that ‘the average sentence lengths 
for possession and supply offences under the PSA are considerably shorter than the average 
sentence lengths for [equivalent] MDA offences’,195 implying that the blanket ban’s lack of offence-
seriousness categorisation has been accounted for with lower average punishment-severity 
compared to MDA offences, therefore PSA sentences are proportional.  PSA offences are supposed 
to be less serious than MDA offences due to the blanket ban providing no graded structure of 
harms.196 However, averages ‘best resist the fluctuation between different samples [and are] not 
an appropriate measure of central tendency for skewed distribution’,197 and it is precisely the 
‘skewed distribution’ found in Cook and Miah’s cases that conflicts with the rule of law’s 
requirement for proportionate sentencing. Additionally, these exemplary punishments are an 





191 ‘“Manchester Gas Man” Spared Jail Over Nitrous Oxide Sales’ BBC News (13 November 2017) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-41972988>. 
192 Rob Kennedy, ‘Barrel Of Laughing Gas: Dealer Caught Supplying Nitrous Oxide to Student Had 36,000 
Canisters of It’ Chronicle Live (6 June 2018) <https://www.chroniclelive.co.uk/news/north-east-
news/laughing-gas-northumbria-university-court-14748442>. 
193 ‘Leeds NOS Dealer Caught with 360 Nitrous Oxide Canisters in McDonald’s Car Park’ Yorkshire Evening 
Post (9 August 2018) <https://www.yorkshireeveningpost.co.uk/news/crime/leeds-nos-dealer-caught-360-
nitrous-oxide-canisters-mcdonalds-car-park-823276>. 
194 Von Hirsch and Ashworth (n 164) 132-3. 
195 HOR (n 2, ch 1) 26. 
196 Home Affairs Committee, Psychoactive Substances: Government’s Response to the Committee’s First 
Report of Session 2015-16 (HC 2015-16, 755) 7-8; CPS, ‘Legal Guidance: Drug Offences’ (12 March 2019) 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/drug-offences>. 
197 S Manikandan, ‘Measures of Central Tendency: The Mean’ (2011) 2(2) JPP 140, 140-1. 
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2(2)(b)(iii) Synthetic Cannabinoid Receptor Agonists 
 
As mentioned, sentencing guidance for PSA offences is obscure, not authoritative198 and has been 
inconsistently applied.  Harris notes that Waka199 provided ‘a mixed message, suggesting that: (1) 
the [2012] Drugs Guideline is [irrelevant]; (2) courts should not ordinarily have regard to that 
guideline; and (3) as the substance in question was a cannabinoid, a comparison with the Drugs 
Guideline was permissible and would serve as a strong indicator as to the appropriate sentence’.200 
After Waka, the Sentencing Council published guidance for cases involving NPS,201 which rather 
equivocally states that ‘sentencers should expect to be provided with expert evidence to assist in 
determining the potency of the particular drug and in equating the quantity in the case with the 
quantities set out in the guidelines in terms of the harm caused’.202 However, Fortson highlights 
that ‘the relationship between potency, effects, toxicity and drug purity, is complex so that even 
with expert assistance, making fair and just comparisons with drug types and quantities that are 
specified in the Guideline [is challenging].203 
 
In practice this has resulted in similar sentences for SCRA offences both before and after third-
generation SCRAs were added to the MDA, due to reliance on the guidelines204 for cannabis/Class 
B drugs: ‘sophisticated’ operations/conspiracies to produce SCRAs contrary to the PSA resulted in 
6-year sentences for those convicted of leading roles and 17-36 months for those with a lesser 
involvement.205 At the lower end, the appellant in Waka received a 7-month sentence on appeal 
for intent to supply £500 of SCRAs.206 Similarly, sentences for large-scale SCRA offences under the 
MDA have included 5 years 5 months for leading roles and 32 months for lesser ones,207 and 
sentences for Waka-level dealing have ranged from 4-10 months.208 
 
198 Sentencing Council, ‘Sentencing of Drug Offences’ (n 166). 
199 Waka [2018] EWCA Crim 125 
200 Lyndon Harris, ‘Sentencing: R v Waka (Mohammed Hussain) (Case Comment)’ [2018] Crim LR 675, 677. 
201 Sentencing Council, ‘Sentencing of Drug Offences’ (n 166). 
202 ibid 2. 
203 Rudi Fortson, ‘Revising the Sentencing Guideline in Drug Cases’ [2020] Crim LR 513, 522. 
204 Sentencing Council, ‘Drug Offences: Definitive Guideline’ (2012) 13, 21 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Drug-offences-definitive-guideline-Web.pdf>. 
205 Finn [2018] EWCA Crim 2125; ‘Four Jailed Over £300k Spice Haul in Oldham and Stockport’ BBC News (23 
January 2018) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-42778867>; Jez Hemming, ‘Wrexham 
Spice Gang Jailed for 10 Years’ Daily Post (15 October 2018) <https://www.dailypost.co.uk/news/north-
wales-news/wrexham-spice-gang-jailed-10-15282053>. 
206 Waka (n 199). 
207 Stephanie Finnegan, ‘Dealers “Flooding Streets of Leeds with Spice” Found with Huge Hoard of Weapons, 
Drugs and Cash’ Leeds Live (26 September 2019) <https://www.leeds-live.co.uk/news/leeds-news/spice-
dealers-jailed-after-weapons-16986390>.  




These sentences, although consistent, are disproportionate. As PSA offences are supposed to be 
less serious than MDA offences, the consistency in sentencing under both frameworks conflicts with 
the principle of rank-ordering.  Comparing SCRA sentencing under the PSA and MDA in prison-
related offence contexts also highlights further disproportionality, although reliable analysis is 
limited by the few reported cases. Custodial possession is the most likely PSA offence to result in 
immediate custody, with an average sentence length of 4 months.209 However, the court in Ware210 
upheld the appellant’s 14-month sentence (but altered it to run concurrently instead of 
consecutively) for custodial possession of under 3 grams of SCRAs, demonstrating there can be very 
wide deviation from the average. Conversely, after third-generation SCRAs were added to the MDA, 
Stacey Sullivan was given 16 months (just two more than Ware) for the more serious crime of 
possession with intent to supply (a much larger amount of) approximately 56 grams of SCRAs, then-
Class B drugs, into a prison.211  
 
 
This concludes the analysis of the PSA’s ‘diagonal’ efficiency, i.e., the area of overlap between the 
preceding discussion of the Act’s ‘horizontal’ efficiency (its adherence with normative principles of 
criminalisation) and the following discussion of the Act’s ‘vertical’ efficiency (its legitimacy as an 
exercise of state power). The PSA is an inefficient statute in these ‘diagonal’ terms, as it sacrifices 
the rule of law-based principles of maximum certainty and proportionate sentencing in its pursuit 
of a vague, ‘catch-all’ definition of psychoactivity, which has triggered the knock-on effect whereby 
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2(3) Vertical Efficiency 
 
This section analyses the Act’s efficiency ‘vertically’, i.e., whether the mode of governance inherent 
in the PSA is a cost-effective, proportionate, and legitimate exercise of state power.212 After an 
outline of Dubber’s conceptions of ‘law’ vis-à-vis ‘police’ as paradigmatic modes of governance, the 
remainder of this chapter identifies which mode of governance the PSA conforms to; critiques the 
efficiency of this mode; discerns the normative bases for potential alternative – and more 
intrinsically efficient – ways of governing NPS;213 and briefly sketches these alternative options. 
 
2(3)(a) ‘Police’ Versus ‘Law’ 
 
Zedner and Loader note that ‘Dubber’s analysis [provides] a lens through which one could 
potentially deepen understanding of the myriad ways in which the claims to efficient management 
of disorderly people [read: NPS vendors] and things [read: NPS] … do battle with those of liberal 
legalism—struggles in which the power to maximize welfare or order are pressed into service, if 
necessary, against the ideals of justice’.214 Dubber distinguishes the ‘police’ and ‘law’ modes of 
governance as being characterised by heteronomy and autonomy, respectively; and he identifies a 
post-Enlightenment shift from police to law as being a shift ‘from prudence to justice, from 
discretion to duty, from arbitrariness to principledness, from guideline to norm, [and] from 
competence to legitimacy’.215 He also claims that police’s ‘defining characteristic [is] its very 
undefinability’,216 and that: 
 
the apparent paradox between the pursuit of security … and the infringement of individual 
rights … resolves itself once the preventive state is seen as a police state, i.e., a state that 
pursues not the security of individual persons but of itself, or more precisely that seeks to 
maintain [the peace of the sovereign personified householder] or its abstract depersonified 
alternative (the public peace). The notion of individual rights is foreign to the police state; 
the victim in penal police is not the individual, the harm not to the individual’s rights, nor 
the wrong the disrespect of one person’s … rights by another; nor is the offender in penal 
 
212 Dubber, ‘Preventative Justice’ (n 4); The Police Power (n 7). 
213 With reference to: Farmer, ‘The Jurisprudence of Security’ (n 8). 
214 Ian Loader and Lucia Zedner, ‘Review: Police Beyond Law?’ (2007) 10(1) New Crim LR 142, 145. [My 
editing] 
215 Dubber, ‘Preventative Justice’ (n 4). 
216 Dubber, The Police Power (n 7) 120. 
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police the individual … The offence in penal police involves a disturber of the peace and a 
holder of that peace.217 
 
2(3)(b) PSA: ‘Police’ or ‘Law’? 
 
This chapter’s preceding analysis demonstrates that the PSA exemplifies Dubber’s police paradigm: 
the Act’s conflict with formalist rule of law principles is a prima facie indication of this,218 and the 
PSA’s goal of ending the game of cat and mouse – of pursuing the security and maintenance of the 
established prohibitive legal order – to the detriment of objective individual-level security219 is 
thematically synonymous with ‘the offence in penal police [being a disturbance to the personified 
householder’s peace]’ rather than harm to individual interests. This self-preserving householder-
style governance similarly manifests following critical analysis of the Act’s stated rationale of 
protecting the vulnerable – a term which captures both NPS users, who are all grouped together in 
an autonomy-rejecting ‘vulnerability/transgression nexus’, and also other citizens, whose 
‘vulnerable autonomy’ is threatened by NPS-related antisocial behaviour – which I have argued 
serves to paradoxically and circularly perpetuate prohibitive drug policy.220 The patriarchal state-
householder-knows-best position is further reinforced by the blanket ban, which decrees not only 
what is forbidden on the arbitrary basis of ‘affecting mental functioning or emotional state’, but 
also (arbitrarily) what little is permitted, i.e., alcohol, tobacco, caffeine, etc. Moreover, the PSA’s 
forward-looking preventative police governmentality seeks the security of the state-householder 
under the guise of fairness and proportionality221 by ‘[avoiding] what are perceived as burdensome 
due process protections’ via the novel utilisation of CPOs,222 which require only civil standards of 
proof and contain potentially persuasive reverse burden clauses.223 Additionally, authorities other 
than the professional institution of the police alone can be involved in their creation, which Farmer 
argues ‘links [CPOs] up with a broader police power’.224 Disproportionality in PSA trials, both pre- 
and post-conviction is also created by the toothless requirement to have regard to obscure and 
discretionary sentencing and executive guidelines (which are themselves based on the established 
 
217 Dubber, ‘Preventative Justice’ (n 4). 
218 Or, at least, that the PSA does not exemplify the law governmentality. 
219 2(1)(a)(i)-(ii). 
220 ibid. 
221 Explanatory Notes to the PSA, para 88. 
222 Farmer, ‘The Jurisprudence of Security’ (n 8). 
223 2(1)(a)(iii)(B). 
224 Farmer, ‘The Jurisprudence of Security’ (n 8). 
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prohibitive legal order),225 ‘non-compliance with which is of no consequence [in the police state]’.226 
Finally, the HOR’s unsound conclusions of the PSA’s effectiveness are a further dimension of the 
Act’s police governance, as ‘from a police perspective, the state’s exercise of its penal power is 
subject at best to self -defined, -interpreted, and -enforced, vague, and flexible norms of prudence, 
efficiency, and good governance’.227 
 
2(3)(c) PSA Police: Critique 
 
The police governmentality exercised through the PSA did enable efficiency insofar as it effectively 
proscribes NPS without the time and resource costs entailed by the MDA’s requirement for 
demonstrable harm. However, as NPS proscription was an end pursued by the PSA in itself, and 
police governance is fundamentally unconstrained, Dubber’s account apparently entails that the 
PSA’s police governmentality cannot be subject to a legitimacy critique. In other words, the police 
power ‘[answers] to dictates of efficiency in ways that render any wider insistence upon its 
legitimacy a category mistake’.228 This, Dubber argues, is in contrast to law, of which the end of 
promoting individual autonomy is delivered, legitimised and accountable via principles including 
maximum legal certainty, proportionality, etc.229  
However, Loader and Zedner argue that Dubber’s descriptive claims about the police power ‘could 
suggest an effective way of structuring and restraining the police power on its own terms’.230 If the 
police state ‘seeks to maintain [the peace of the sovereign personified householder] or its abstract 
depersonified alternative (the public peace)’,231 it follows that in the present context the PSA must 
not only effectively proscribe NPS, but this proscription must also be effective in maintaining the 
established prohibitive legal order. The blanket ban has not stopped the emergence of new NPS, 
indicating the threat NPS posed to the prohibitive legal order remains;232 and the evidence of 
evolving attitudes towards prohibitive drug laws including the PSA233 suggests threats to orthodox 
drug policy/the state-householder’s peace are becoming increasing virulent. 
 
225 2(2)(a)(ii); 2(2)(b)(iii). 
226 Markus Dirk Dubber, The Dual Penal State: The Crisis of Criminal Law in Comparative-Historical 
Perspective (2018) 107. 
227 ibid 133. 
228 Loader and Zedner (n 214) 143. 
229 Dubber, The Dual Penal State (n 226) 107. 
230 Loader and Zedner (n 214) 145. 
231 Dubber, ‘Preventative Justice’ (n 4). 
232 2(1)(a)(ii). 
233 Both domestically and internationally: see 3(1)(a); 3(2)(b)-(c). 
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Overall, the police governmentality apparent in the PSA’s provisions is inefficient due to a legislative 
conflation of the end of stopping the game of cat and mouse via the blanket ban, the end of securing 
the maintenance of prohibition, and the (legitimate) end of retaining some state control in the 
supply of potentially harmful substances. This conflation has resulted in the fulfilment of only one 
among many effectiveness criteria that were intended to be realised by utilising the police mode of 
governance in response to NPS, at the cost of others. Loader and Zedner further argue that 
Dubber’s conception of the state-householder in the police state imposes a duty on the 
householder to maximise the household’s welfare, and that this imposes restraints on ‘that which 
is not utility-maximising’.234 There is a danger here that the vertical analysis of the PSA as a police 
mode of governance collapses into the harm-based critique of the Act expounded earlier in this 
chapter. However, a more helpful, novel and holistic critique of the PSA’s vertical efficiency might 
be achieved by setting aside Dubber’s separation of police and law as distinct modes of governance, 
and considering legal solutions to NPS-related problems within Farmer’s wider conception of 
security-based jurisprudence that takes the inseparability of police and law as its starting point. 
 
2(3)(d) Normative Bases for Alternative Approaches 
 
Farmer argues that Dubber’s ‘vision of police as an alternative form of order seriously underplays 
the significance of prevention and deterrence as the logics which were understood to underpin the 
exercise of the modern criminal law, and the understandings of civil order that it sought to 
secure’.235 Farmer’s conception of a jurisprudence of security is summarised thus: 
 
Insofar as security is – unlike police – not defined by its very indefinability and therefore 
may serve a function other than the evasion of principled constraint and critical analysis in 
the name of the pursuit of the undefined welfare of an undefined public, the project of 
giving meaning to the notoriously vague end of security bears the promise of constructive 
debate. It may emerge as the common ground where law theories of crime as an infliction 
of harm on persons and police theories of crime as an offense against the authority of the 
sovereign-householder can meet.236 
 
 
234 Loader and Zedner (n 214) 145. 
235 Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law (n 9) 47. 
236 Markus Dirk Dubber and Mariana Valverde, ‘Introduction’ in Dubber and Valverde (n 8). 
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I have not argued that utilising elements of the police mode of governance in response to NPS is 
objectionable in principle.237 Rather, the modes of governance manifested in the PSA – both 
substantively police and superficially law – seek the benefits of both modes while, on balance, 
efficiently achieving those of neither. A legislative reappraisal of drug users’ autonomy is essential 
for efficient management of the NPS problem, as the status quo, inter alia, disregards the non-
problem majority of drug users, creates barriers for those using NPS for research purposes, and 
perpetuates an inappropriate system. Such reappraisal, it is submitted, could ‘[stabilise 
expectations] in relation to the conduct of social life and state power’238 among those groups 
primarily targeted by drug laws, without resorting to counter-productive, arbitrary and politically 
expedient239 legislation. Equally, however, the demonstrable harm and wrongfulness associated 
with aspects of NPS and their markets – both pre- and post-PSA – and the position of incompetent 
management that the emergence of NPS placed existing policy in, necessitates some police/state-
householder governance, while crucially recognising the police’s inherent requirement of 
prudence, as ‘it is easy to point to a harm that one’s pet legislation is designed to eradicate; it is a 
lot harder to show that it eradicates it’.240 
Having identified the benefits and inefficiencies created by both the PSA and the pre-PSA 
governmentally-unregulated model, the ‘project of giving meaning to the notoriously vague end of 
security’ becomes realisable. NPS-related problems are multifaceted, permeating across legal, 
political and social spheres, and threaten security at different levels within each sphere.241 
Therefore, a nuanced approach located between the polar opposites of an autonomy-disregarding 
blanket ban and a disorderly, unregulated NPS free-for-all is arguably the most probable means of 
efficiently securing both autonomy and (civil) order. This chapter’s largely theoretical efficiency 
analysis is ill-suited to charting the cartography of such a middle ground: this challenge is outside 
the scope of a thesis evaluating the PSA specifically, and has been attempted elsewhere.242 
However, the European Commission’s legislative efficiency evaluation guidelines require asking 
whether there are ‘opportunities to simplify the legislation or reduce unnecessary regulatory costs 
without undermining the intended objectives of the intervention’.243 To conclude on the PSA’s 
 
237 Including the use of preventative punishment when certain criteria are met: 2(1)(a)(iii)(A). 
238 Farmer, ‘The Jurisprudence of Security’ (n 8). 
239 Burgess (n 52) 119. 
240 John Gardner, ‘Book Review: Douglas Husak, Over-Criminalisation: The Limits of the Criminal Law’ 
(August 2008) NDPR <https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/overcriminalization-the-limits-of-the-criminal-law/>. 
241 To recap: within the legal sphere, questions arise of the Act’s coherence with various normative 
principles of criminalisation. Within the political, NPS threaten legislators’ credibility and create a tension as 
to the mode of governance that ought to be employed. Threats NPS pose in the social sphere are 
distinguishable at individual and collective levels.  
242 E.g., Stephen Rolles, After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation (2012); Psychoactive Substances 
Act 2013 (New Zealand); Cannabis Act 2018 (Canada). 
243 European Commission (n 11, Introduction) 61. 
69 
 
vertical efficiency, contextualised within a wider jurisprudence of security, the existence of some 
potential opportunities to reduce the PSA’s costs, while retaining the Act’s benefits, are worth 
outlining. 
 
2(3)(e) Efficient Alternative Approaches: A Sketch 
 
Recognising that constructing a regulatory system for NPS ‘will necessitate a fundamental 
rethinking of the contents of the drug policy toolbox’, Sneddon suggests ‘criminal law enforcement 
[should play] a very small role within strategies for regulating the NPS trade. Instead … the emphasis 
needs to be on understanding regulation as a decentred activity, involving both state and non-state 
actors in polycentric networks of governance’.244 Options for decentred NPS regulation do exist. 
The value of NPS users’ capacity to provide information to, and engage with, efforts of policymakers 
in responding to problematic NPS via online discussion forums has been recognised;245 and 
headshop owners’ employment of harm-reduction strategies pre-PSA demonstrates that the 
appetite for decentralised (but prudent) governance also exists among potential NPS vendors.  
Leitzel argues that the ‘center’s role should be to insist upon [a robustness principle]’, i.e., that vice 
policies ‘should be robust with respect to departures from full rationality … [working] well if 
everyone is fully informed and completely rational, and [working] well even if [many people] are 
occasionally (or frequently) irrational in their vice-related choices’.246 To enable the provision of 
support and protection to irrational people without imposing substantial costs on rational people, 
qua the ‘robustness principle’,247 Leitzel suggests taxation, licensing and advertising restrictions as 
potential solutions. 
Determining an appropriate level of taxation which advances ‘robustness’ is difficult,248 but has 
arguably been achieved in Scotland. The Scottish Government recently introduced minimum unit 
pricing (MUP) on alcohol purchases,249 which the Supreme Court concluded was an efficient means 
of responding to harmful drinking without imposing unacceptable burdens on the non-problem 
drinking population.250 The legislation thus exemplifies both ‘robustness’ and Farmer’s 
 
244 Toby Sneddon, ‘Drug Policy and Global Regulatory Capitalism: The Case of New Psychoactive Substances 
(NPS)’ (2014) 25 Int J Drug Policy 1019, 1022. 
245 Damien Rhumorbarbe and others, ‘Monitoring New Psychoactive Substances: Exploring the Contribution 
of an Online Discussion Forum’ (2019) 73 Int J Drug Policy 273, 274-5. 
246 Jim Leitzel, Regulating Vice: Misguided Prohibitions and Realistic Controls (2008) 17, 265. 
247 ibid 74. 
248 ibid 155. 
249 Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012. Strictly speaking, MUP is not a ‘tax’, but this term is used 
here for simplicity. 
250 Scotch Whisky Association v Lord Advocate [2017] UKSC 76. 
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jurisprudence of security framework. It employs a preventative logic similar to Dubber’s conception 
of the state-householder, but which (non-arbitrarily) seeks to maximise the defined welfare of a 
defined public251 (i.e., to prevent the most harmful health effects of heavy alcohol consumption 
among those most likely to over-consume alcohol; and also to secure victims of alcohol-related 
crime against its most likely perpetrators) while respecting individuals’ autonomous choices. 
Research indicates that MUP has been targeted successfully, with ‘reductions of purchased alcohol 
only [occurring] in the households that bought the most alcohol’.252  
Taxation of NPS alone would not advance the Act’s goal of removing otherwise-unregulated and 
(ostensibly) disorder-driving high street headshops, which arguably threatened citizens’ ‘vulnerable 
autonomy’ and sold mislabelled and impure products. Licensing opportunities exist in various 
forms, but even the most centralised could be normatively compatible with Farmer’s, Sneddon’s 
and Leitzel’s proposals.253 For example, Nordic countries’ state-run alcohol monopolies exemplify 
the police governmentality by securing public welfare through restricted availability, high prices 
and stringent restrictions on vendors,254 yet promote autonomous, responsible consumption. 
Studies indicate this approach more successfully promotes welfare than privatised markets, 
including those found in other European countries,255 while customer satisfaction remains high.256 
The criminal law’s role, then, would be the mechanism for ‘[insisting] upon robustness’.257 In the 
context of regulatory offences in the corporate sphere, the use of police-esque powers258 such as 
reverse burdens of proof (which are illegitimately found in the PSA’s CPOs) might be justified on 
the basis of low offence-seriousness,259 the accused’s voluntary engagement in a regulated 
activity,260 and as such ‘defences themselves encourage efforts to secure regulatory compliance’.261 
Moreover, despite it being a more controversial262 principle than, e.g., harm prevention, this 
 
251 Text to n 236. 
252 Amy O’Donnell, ‘Immediate Impact of Minimum Unit Pricing on Alcohol Purchases in Scotland: 
Controlled Interrupted Time Series Analysis for 2015-18’ (2019) 366 I15274. 
253 For a wider discussion of the practicalities of licensing, see Leitzel (n 246) 161-5. 
254 That only the state may sell alcohol exemplifies Dubber’s description of the ‘[maintenance] of [the 
sovereign personified householder’s] peace’: 2(3)(a). 
255 Tim Stockwell and others, ‘Estimating the Public Health Impact of Disbanding a Government Alcohol 
Monopoly: Application of New Methods to the Case of Sweden’ (2018) 18(1400) BMC Pub Health; WHO, 
‘Status Report on Alcohol Consumption, Harm and Policy Responses in 30 European Countries’ (2019) 5 
<https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/disease-prevention/alcohol-use/publications/2019/status-
report-on-alcohol-consumption,-harm-and-policy-responses-in-30-european-countries-2019>. 
256 Jenny Cisneros Örnberg and Hildigunnur Ólafsdóttir, ‘How to Sell Alcohol? Nordic Alcohol Monopolies in 
a Changing Epoch’ (2008) 25(2) NAD 129, 144-5. 
257 Leitzel (n 246) 265. 
258 Text to n 224. 
259 David Hamer, ‘The Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Burdens: A Balancing Act’ (2007) 66(1) CLJ 
142, 149. 
260 Keane and Davidson (n 89) paras 5-25 to 5-29. 
261 Horder, Ashworth’s Principles (n 5) 182. 
262 Horder, ‘Harmless Wrongdoing’ (n 61). 
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approach to NPS would also conform to a minimalist conception of criminalisation, and achieve 
another dimension of horizontal efficiency.263  
 
This discussion of alternative approaches to regulating NPS is not exhaustive. The practical 
challenges faced by alternative approaches are numerous, and include dismantling the post-PSA 
SOC-led NPS market. Additionally, a regulatory scheme for NPS, but not traditional drugs, would be 
arbitrary, ‘[necessitating] a fundamental rethinking of the contents of the drug policy toolbox’.264 
However, the existence of alternative approaches to the state’s governance of NPS (which do not 
entail the PSA’s theoretical and practical inefficiencies as identified throughout this chapter) are 





263 Horder, Ashworth’s Principles (n 5) 73-7. 
264 Sneddon (n 244) 1022. 
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Chapter 3: Relevance and Coherence 
 
This chapter follows the final two stages of the European Commission’s guidelines for legislative 




Any legislative evaluation must consider its ongoing relevance, i.e., whether post-enactment 
developments have rendered a statute unfit for purpose or its original purposes obsolete. The 
following discussion argues that changes in UK political priorities regarding drug laws and 




The aforementioned 2019 Scottish Affairs Committee Report recommended ‘that the UK 
Government decriminalises the possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use’.2 As the PSA 
does not criminalise simple NPS possession, this might indicate that the PSA’s approach is still 
politically relevant. However, the Committee hinted that decriminalisation – itself a ‘radical 
departure’ from current drug policy – might lead to a legalised market, which the Committee heard 
‘would deliver more benefits than criminalisation’.3 This nuance carries strong implications for the 
continuing, rather than current, political relevance of the PSA’s criminalisation of the NPS market. 
Moreover, the first report of a Home Office-commissioned independent review of drugs concluded 
that the current approach to NPS has failed in prisons and among vulnerable populations, and that 
increasing resources for enforcement organisations might not enable a sustained reduction in drug 
supply.4 Whether this independent review will recommend implementation of non-prohibitive 
approaches to NPS and/or precipitate a change in political stances is unclear,5 but current signs 
indicate reforms will be recommended. 
 
1 European Commission (n 11, Introduction) 62-3. 
2 Scottish Affairs Committee (n 123, ch 2) para 127. 
3 ibid para 139. 
4 Dame Carol Black, ‘Review of Drugs: Executive Summary’ (2020) 5 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-drugs-phase-one-report>. 
5 The Report is due to be published in early 2021. Recommendations of other independent reviews, such as 




Numerous UK political parties have pledged to reform or review drug laws. Labour and Plaid Cymru 
advocate Commission-led reviews of drug criminalisation;6 the Scottish National Party proposes 
decriminalisation of drug possession and devolution of drug laws;7 the Liberal Democrats favour a 
legally regulated cannabis market and the removal of criminal penalties for drug possession;8 and 
the Green Party supports repealing the PSA/MDA and fully legalising all drugs.9 In spite of these 
stances (which stand in sharp juxtaposition to the wide political support for the PSA’s introduction 
in 2015)10 the Conservatives won a majority in the 2019 general election with a commitment to 
maintain the current criminal justice approach to drug enforcement.11 This signals that the Act 
remains relevant to the majority of currently sitting MPs, although the extent to which drug policy 
played a decisive role in the Brexit-dominated 2019 general election is less clear. Additionally, there 
is tension between the current Government’s commitment to effective enforcement of prohibitive 
drug laws and its pro-Brexit policy, due to the UK’s withdrawal from EU drug-related frameworks 
which are ‘essential to [tackling] serious and organised crime’,12 including the EMCDDA; the early 
warning and risk-assessment procedures for NPS; Europol; and the European Arrest Warrant.13 On 
a continuum of policy relevance, the ‘get Brexit done’ title of the Conservative manifesto 
(underpinned by the ‘red lines’ which forbid UK/EU cooperation in these drug-related 
frameworks)14 demonstrates that effective drug enforcement is evidently less relevant to the 
governing Conservative Party than other priorities, potentially to the erosion of the pledged 





6 Labour Party, ‘It’s Time for Real Change: The Labour Party Manifesto 2019’ (2019) 34-5, 44, 46; Plaid 
Cymru, ‘General Election Manifesto 2019’ (2019) 35. 
7 SNP, ‘Stronger For Scotland: 2019 Manifesto’ (2019) 5, 14-5, 19; ‘SNP Formally Backs Decriminalisation of 
Drugs’ BBC News (13 October 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-
50036173>.  
8 Liberal Democrats, ‘Stop Brexit, Build a Brighter Future: Manifesto 2019’ (2019) 61, 71, 75, 83. 
9 Green Party, ‘If Not Now, When? Manifesto 2019’ (2019) 66-7. 
10 Martin Horton-Eddison and Joe Whittaker, ‘UK General Election 2017: Where Do the Parties Stand on 
Drug Policy?’ (2017). 
11 Conservative and Unionist Party, ‘Get Brexit Done, Unleash Britain’s Potential: The Conservative and 
Unionist Party Manifesto 2019’ (2019) 18-9.  
12 NCA, ‘Statement on Contingency Planning in Relation to UK Withdrawal from the European Union’ 
<https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/nca-statement-on-contingency-planning-in-relation-to-
uk-withdrawal-from-the-european-union>. 
13 The Law Enforcement and Security (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, SI 2019/742, regs 18-9, 37, 
55. 
14 Andres Roman-Urrestarazu and others, ‘Brexit Threatens the UK’s Ability to Tackle Illicit Drugs and 
Organised Crime: What Needs to Happen Now?’ (2019) 123 Health Policy 521, 522. 
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3(1)(b) Technological  
 
Pertinent to whether the PSA’s ‘original objectives (still) correspond to needs’15 is the evolving 
nature of the online NPS market. The PSA’s goal of ending NPS sales has displaced NPS market 
actors from headshop owners to SOC organisations, but also (in part) the market locus from high 
street and clearnet outlets to darknet cryptomarkets. These are online marketplaces, accessed via 
specialised software enabling anonymity for sellers and buyers, where goods16 are typically paid for 
in largely-untraceable cryptocurrencies.17   
 
A study of the PSA’s immediate impact on darknet NPS activity found that the number of darknet 
NPS vendors, specific NPS and NPS listings all substantially increased between October 2015 and 
October 2016.18 The UK is now ‘leading the world in the rise of purchasing drugs on the darknet’,19 
with UK darknet drug sales rising substantially between January 2015 to May 2017.20 Research 
conducted in 2016 found that UK drug cryptomarket vendors made the highest revenues of any 
European country,21 and this ranking has since remained constant.22 Furthermore, the 2020 Global 
Drug Survey (an international survey of a non-representative, self-selected sample of 100,000 to 
500,000 internet users who use drugs) found substantial (approximately two-fold or more) 
increases in the number of English, Welsh and Scottish people buying drugs over the darknet since 
2014, as part of a global upward trend.23   
Cryptomarkets have a modest share of the overall drug market (with NPS accounting for a small 
percentage of all drugs sold),24 but there is evidence that use of cryptomarkets is likely to continue25 
and/or increase despite the barriers created by the requirements of specialised knowledge and 
software to access them.26 Therefore, the PSA’s original objective of removing visible NPS retailers 
 
15 European Commission (n 11, Introduction) 62. 
16 Most commonly illegal drugs. 
17 UNODC, World Drug Report 2020 Booklet 4: Cross-Cutting Issues (2020) 67 (WDR 2020). 
18 Elle Wadsworth and others, ‘A Market on Both “Sides” of the Law: The Use of the Hidden Web for the 
Sale of New Psychoactive Substances’ (2017) 32(3) Hum Psychopharmacol Clin Exp e2596. 
19 Deligianni (n 178, ch 1) 514. 
20 WDR 2020 (n 17) 73. 
21 Kristy Kruithof and others, Internet-Facilitated Drugs Trade: An Analysis of the Size, Scope and the Role of 
the Netherlands (2016). 
22 WDR 2020 (n 17) 74. However, darknet vendors ‘do not necessarily indicate their true locations’. 
23 ibid 79. 
24 ibid 60, 72. This might reflect that NPS use has historically been low compared to traditional drugs, and 
also reflect definitional inconsistencies in what constitutes ‘NPS’: Peacock (n 1, Introduction).  
25 WDR 2020 (n 17) 69-70. 
26 Michala Kowalski, Claire Hooker and Monica J Barratt, ‘Should We Smoke It For You As Well? An 
Ethnographic Analysis of a Drug Cryptomarket Environment’ (2019) 73 Int J Drug Policy 245. 
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is not relevant to current needs which involve darknet NPS retailers,27 particularly as both pre- and 
post-PSA studies have noted the capacity of cryptomarkets to diffuse NPS to offline trade.28 The 
PSA’s roundabout encouragement of cryptomarket use may also have diluted the Act’s (already-
limited) successes effected by removing headshops, indicating another facet of the PSA’s 
irrelevance. 
 
The rationales underpinning the PSA’s other original objectives (i.e., of ending the game of cat and 
mouse, reducing use, and reducing harms) are uncontroversial29 and do remain relevant. However, 
the post-PSA cryptomarket advances impact the relevance of the PSA’s implementation of those 
other goals’ wider rationales. 
International efforts to curb darknet sales have created a new game of cat and mouse. From 2010-
2014 there were three dominant, enduring drug cryptomarkets.30 Following their shutdown via 
enforcement operations and hackers, ‘a proliferation of markets came into existence’, including the 
major AlphaBay and Hansa platforms which were successively shut down by international 
enforcement operations in 2017.31 The latest EMCDDA/Europol report evidences 10 currently 
operational marketplaces.32 Additionally, it notes the ‘darknet markets ecosystem is dynamic and 
resilient’, and that continued fragmentation of large marketplaces into smaller ones will create 
further barriers to enforcement.33 International darknet enforcement efforts are grounded in 
myriad (inter)national statutes of which the PSA is one small part, and are motivated by the wide 
range of illegal goods offered by cryptomarkets, of which NPS are one small part. Nonetheless, the 
PSA’s direct impact on increasing darknet NPS activity and the major role of UK-based cryptomarket 
NPS vendors and customers – coupled with the UK’s obligations to cooperate with these 
international enforcement efforts34 – cements the Act’s place in the creation of this new game. 
Furthermore, cryptomarkets have impacted the relevance of the PSA’s criminalisation-based 
implementation of the ‘reducing use’ and ‘reducing harms’ goals. The wide range of substances 
 
27 Maintaining headshop-free high streets post-PSA cannot be a relevant objective where the market locus 
is merely displaced, rather than eliminated. 
28 Judith Aldridge and David Décary-Hétub, ‘Hidden Wholesale: The Drug Diffusing Capacity of Online Drug 
Cryptomarkets’ (2016) 35 Int J Drug Policy 7; Peacock (n 1, Introduction) 1679-80. 
29 Re: the rationale of ending the game of cat and mouse, recall 2(3)(d)-(e) advocated a ‘middle ground’ 
between an NPS free-for-all and a blanket ban, which would seek to end (so far as practicable) the 
emergence of unregulated NPS. It is submitted that reducing use is uncontroversial in the same way as 
encouraging people to drink less alcohol, cease smoking and reduce unhealthy food consumption is 
uncontroversial; and reducing harms (NPS-related or otherwise) is a fundamental tenet of the criminal law.  
30 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report 2019 (2019) 68. 
31 ibid 69. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid 67, 70. 
34 Commission Decision (EU) 2017/388 of 6 March 2017, OJ L59/39.  
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offered by cryptomarkets have extended users’ drug repertoires, and ‘the proportion of people 
purchasing drugs on the darknet who did not use drugs prior to their first drug purchase on the 
darknet doubled [between 2015-2020]’.35 Additionally, the anonymous nature of cryptomarkets 
and cryptocurrency transactions entails easy money laundering and its associated harms.36 Given 
the majority of cryptomarket goods are drugs (including NPS), decriminalising37 sales of NPS and 
other drugs might yield positive returns in ameliorating these harms, and would therefore be a 



















35 WDR 2020 (n 17) 78. While overall UK NPS use has reduced post-PSA, these figures do impact the Act’s 
continuing relevance. 
36 Rolf van Wegberg, Jan-Jaap Oerlemans and Oskar van Deventer, ‘Bitcoin Money Laundering: Mixed 
Results? An Explorative Study on Money Laundering of Cybercrime Proceeds Using Bitcoin’ (2018) 25(2) J 
Financ Crime 419; Valeriia Dyntu and Oleh Dykyi, ‘Cryptocurrency in the System of Money Laundering’ 








As no laws exist in a vacuum, legislative evaluation must also consider the statute’s coherence, i.e., 
whether it works in synergy or tension with other measures.38 The PSA’s coherence will be analysed 
in four contexts: international legislation and obligations; international drug policy; domestic 
legislation; and domestic drug policy. 
 
3(2)(a) International Legislation  
 
Of the >950 identified NPS, only 48 are controlled across the three main UN conventions on 
recreational drugs.39 Nonetheless, the PSA’s coherence with the spirit of these conventions can still 
be assessed. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 and its amending 1972 Protocol;40 the 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971;41 and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 198842 all require party states to implement a criminal justice 
approach to drugs, i.e., a normative focus, to which the PSA adheres. Moreover, Article 3(4) of the 
1988 Convention provides that states must make serious offences liable to punishment by 
imprisonment, and allows for minor offences to be dispensed with via alternatives to conviction or 
punishment. Insofar as this, the PSA’s provision for incremental penalties ranging from a fine to 7 
years’ imprisonment is coherent with these international frameworks.43 However, one area of 
dissonance is that all three Conventions require states to ensure the availability of controlled drugs 
for medical and scientific purposes, which the PSA has failed to do.44 
 
There have been various European-level attempts to create harmonising NPS/drug legislation. 1993 
saw the creation of the EMCDDA45 and a Schengen-based measure aimed at improving 
international cooperation in combating drug trafficking.46 A 1997 Joint Action created:  
 
 
38 European Commission (n 11, Introduction) 62-3. 
39 UNODC, ‘Early Warning Advisory on NPS’ (2019) <https://www.unodc.org/LSS/Page/NPS>. 
40 30 March 1961, 520 UNTS 151; 25 March 1972, 976 UNTS 3. 
41 21 February 1971, 1019 UNTS 175. 
42 20 December 1988, 1582 UNTS 95. 
43 PSA, s 10. 
44 1(2)(b). 
45 Council Regulation (EEC) 302/93 of 8 February 1993, OJ L36/1. 
46 Decision (EC) (SCH/Com-ex (93)14) of 14 December 1993, OJ L239/427. 
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a mechanism for rapid exchange of information on new synthetic drugs [i.e., drugs not 
listed in the 1971 Convention and which pose a comparable serious threat to public health] 
in order to permit the application of the measures of control on psychotropic substances … 
equally to new synthetic drugs.47 
 
Minimum/maximum custodial penalties for these control measures were prescribed in 2004;48 a 
replacement to the 1997 Joint Action was created in 2005 to strengthen the information-exchange 
framework (and also updated the terminology used to ‘NPS’);49 and the EMCDDA was recast in 
2006.50 However, the 2005 system was soon rendered ineffective by the ‘rapid rise of NPS in the 
EU’,51 eventually resulting in an updated 2017 Regulation aimed at further reinforcing the early-
warning and risk-assessment procedures by reducing the requisite deadlines for early-warning/risk-
assessment,52 and an accompanying Directive enabling easier control of specific NPS across 
jurisdictions by specifying minimum common rules on NPS offences and penalties.53 
The UK’s coherence with these measures has been mixed. The UK participated in the 1997-2006 
measures,54 but only implemented the drugs cooperation parts of the Schengen acquis in 2005.55 
The UK later backtracked, deciding not to participate in European NPS law harmonisation 
attempts,56 and was therefore not bound by the 2017 Directive on rules regarding NPS offences 
and penalties or the 1993 Schengen drug trafficking cooperation measures post-2014.57 This was 
deliberately done to ensure non-coherence between any future UK NPS laws (e.g., the PSA) and EU 
NPS measures, which the UK Government claimed would ‘fetter the UK’s discretion to control 
different [NPS]’.58 
The 2017 Directive imposed minimum requirements, with the caveat that ‘Member States may 
maintain or introduce … with regard to [NPS], any national control measures that they consider 
appropriate’.59 Additionally, the few NPS listed in the 2017 Directive were captured by existing UK 
 
47 Joint Action 97/396/JHA of 16 June 1997, OJ L167/1. 
48 Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004, OJ L335/8. 
49 Council Decision 2005/387/JHA of 10 May 2005, OJ L127/32. 
50 Regulation (EC) 1920/2006 of 12 December 2006, OJ L376/1. 
51 Ute Stiegel, ‘Legislating NPS in the European Union’ in Corazza and Roman-Urrestarazu (n 12, ch 1). 
52 Regulation (EU) 2017/2101 of 15 November 2017, OJ L305/1. 
53 Directive (EU) 2017/2103 of 15 November 2017, OJ L305/12. 
54 Adopted unanimously by Member States under: Treaty on the European Union, Title VI. 
55 Council Decision 2004/926/EC of 22 December 2004, OJ L395/70 art 1; Council Decision 2000/365/EC of 
29 May 2000, OJ L131/43 art 1(c)(i). 
56 Protocol (No 19) OJ C326/290 art 4; Protocol (No 21) OJ C202/295. 
57 Directive (EU) 2017/2103 (n 89); Council Decision 2014/857/EU of 1 December 2014 OJ L345/1. However, 
the 2006 EMCDDA and the 2017 early-warning/risk-assessment Regulations (ns 50, 52) did apply. 
58 HL Deb 13 January 2014, vol 751, col WS1.  
59 Directive (EU) 2017/2103 (n 53) art 1b. 
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legislation prior to the Directive’s implementation,60 (and a separate draft regulation was not 
implemented),61 so concerns about ‘fetter[ing] the UK’s discretion’ came to no fruition. Although 
the PSA’s blanket ban is therefore not in tension with the 2017 Directive’s minimum requirements, 
the Act is not formally or substantively in synergy with it either. For example, the PSA’s ‘mental 
functioning/emotional state’ -based definition of a ‘psychoactive substance’ contrasts with the 
2017 Directive’s harm-based procedure for controlling NPS.62 Thus, the UK’s blanket control of less 
harmful NPS, e.g., nitrous oxide, has no equivalent in EU law, and the PSA is therefore perceivable 
as the latest manifestation of the historical incoherence between UK and European NPS legislation.  
 
3(2)(b) International Drug Policy  
 
A cornerstone of the three UN Conventions’ hard-line criminal justice enforcement policy is a 
requirement for total consensus among states.63 The PSA’s criminal justice approach is normatively 
coherent with those Conventions, but there have been developments among signatory states 
reminiscent of the shift64 in UK political attitudes towards UK drug laws. Tracking the extent of these 
dilutions to the original uncompromising policy enables comparisons and conclusions to be made 
regarding the PSA’s coherence with current international drug policy. 
 
Encapsulating the hard-line orthodox approach, the 1961 Convention is the ‘only [UN] treaty 
characterising the activity it seeks to regulate, control or prohibit as being “evil”’.65 Though not 
violating the explicit and connoted requirements of combating this ‘evil’, over the following 
decades various European states implemented more relaxed measures towards illicit drug 
enforcement by employing administrative instead of criminal penalties for possession offences.66 
At the 1998 UN General Assembly Special Session of the World Drug Problem (UNGASS), member 
states formally ‘reaffirmed [their] unwavering determination and commitment’ to the Conventions. 
However, the German ambassador’s statement that 26 states ‘wished to add an Interpretative 
 
60 E.g., Mephedrone is an MDA-controlled drug; methoxetamine was subject to TCDO; and MDMB-CHMICA 
was controlled by the PSA before the EU legislation entered into force: 1(2)(a)-(b). 
61 Procedure 2013/0305/COD, COM (2013) 619. 
62 Directive 2017/2103 (n 53) art 1a. 
63 Known as the ‘Vienna Consensus’. For two comprehensive discussions which informed this section, see: 
Neil Boister, ‘Waltzing on the Vienna Consensus on Drug Control? Tensions in the International System for 
the Control of Drugs’ (2016) 29 Leiden J Int Law 389; David R Bewley-Taylor, International Drug Control: 
Consensus Fractured (2012). 
64 3(1)(a). 
65 Rick Lines, ‘“Deliver Us From Evil”? The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 50 Years On’ [2010] Intl J 
Hum Rights Drug Policy 3, 7. 
66 Boister (n 63) 394. 
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Statement to the already agreed Political declaration, [and the following] series of hostile country 
responses, removed what had become an increasingly precarious façade of harmony’.67  
In the post-1998 UNGASS decade, a series of ‘soft defections’ at various levels resulted in ‘attrition’ 
from the Conventions’ ‘authoritative norm’.68 At the UN policy level, despite attempts of 
‘prohibition-oriented states to block [the] shift away from a zero-tolerance approach to drug use 
towards one centred on public health’,69 in 2003 the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) 
expressed a softened ‘ultimate aim’ of the Conventions, as being ‘[reducing] harm’ rather than the 
treaty wording of ‘combating evil’.70 In 2004, the INCB stated that ‘practice of exempting small 
quantities of drugs from criminal prosecution is consistent with the [Conventions]’,71 validating the 
use72 of administrative penalties in numerous states.  
Harder defection at state level is observable in the legalisation of recreational cannabis markets in 
Uruguay, Canada and some USA states, further weakening the internal coherence73 of international 
drug policy. Such radicalism has no consensus support among international policymakers74 given 
the reaffirmation of the Conventions by member states at the 2016 UNGASS, thus rendering the 
hard-line orthodox policy the default formal international position. However, the post-1998 
UNGASS developments, buttressed by the PSA-era endorsements of decriminalising drug users by 
two UN Secretary Generals,75 and a 2017 Joint UN Statement calling for ‘[the repeal of] punitive 
laws that have been proven to have negative health outcomes [including] possession of drugs for 
personal use’,76 demonstrate that insofar as criminalisation of drug possession, the hard-line 
orthodox is anachronistic. 
 
Despite some legislative coherence,77 there is little NPS policy coherence between European states 
or at the EU level, let alone at the UN level.78 A recent comparative study of six EU countries’ NPS 
 
67 Bewley-Taylor (n 63) 2. 
68 ibid 20-1. 
69 ibid 102-3. 
70 INCB, Report: 2003 (E.04.XI.1, 2004) para 218. 
71 INCB, Report: 2004 (E.05.XI.3, 2005) para 538. 
72 Including Spain, Portugal, Mexico, Argentina, Slovenia, Croatia, Czechia, and Bulgaria: Boister (n 63) 394; 
EMCDDA, ‘Countries’ <https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries_en>. 
73 I.e., the ‘Vienna Consensus’. 
74 Though consensus for radical change exists among international drug policy experts: Joanne Csete and 
others, ‘Public Health and International Drug Policy’ (2016) 387(10026) Lancet 1427.  
75 Transform, ‘The UN Chief Executives Board Unanimously Endorses Decriminalisation of People Who Use 
Drugs’ (2019) <https://transformdrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/UN-CEB-Briefing-2019.pdf>. 
76 UN, ‘Joint United Nations Statement on Ending Discrimination in Health Care Settings’ (2017) 
<https://www.who.int/en/news-room/detail/27-06-2017-joint-united-nations-statement-on-ending-
discrimination-in-health-care-settings>.  
77 Directive (EU) 2017/2103 (n 53). 
78 The UN ‘urges Member States to use and follow the scheduling processes of the [Conventions]’ with 
regards to NPS: UN CND Res 57/9 (2014) para 8. 
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policies found limited NPS policy harmonisation between member states, which have formulated 
approaches independently.79 The UK’s NPS policy was noted as ‘harm reduction’ (a policy shared 
by the other states except Sweden which pursues a ‘drug free society’ goal), largely due to the 
study’s consideration of the UK’s 2017 Drug Strategy in addition to PSA:80 isolating regulatory 
measures, the study noted a contrast between the PSA’s blanket ban approach and the approach 
of other jurisdictions.81  
Among the few significant areas of coherence in European NPS policy is the EU Drugs Strategy 2013-
2020, which priorities identification and early-warning/risk-assessment procedures for NPS.82 
However, options for controlling NPS are strongly contested at EU level, evidenced by the European 
Council’s rejection of a European Parliament-approved draft regulation which aimed to create a 
three-tier approach, whereby low-risk NPS would remain uncontrolled; medium-risk NPS 
temporarily banned; and high-risk NPS permanently banned.83 Despite its non-adoption, Colson 
notes that ‘the draft was in itself another sign of the spectacular landslide moving the ground below 
the century-old drug prohibition regime’,84 given the draft’s sanctioning of recreational (albeit ‘low-
risk’) drug market. 
 
3(2)(c) Domestic Legislation and Drug Policy 
 
The UK’s three legislative measures relating to NPS are the PSA; Temporary Class Drug Orders 
(TCDO);85 and the MDA. They all share a coherent normative focus of a prohibitive, criminal justice 
approach to NPS. As mentioned, the PSA was intended to complement, not replace, TCDOs and the 
MDA as part of an overall classificatory framework for recreational drugs. For this framework to be 
coherent, the individual components must adhere to ‘the two basic assumptions of any 
classification system [i.e., that the] categories must be mutually exclusive and collectively 
 
79 Jessica Neicun and others, ‘Mapping Novel Psychoactive Substances Policy in the EU: The Case of 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Poland, the United Kingdom and Sweden’ (2019) 14(6) PLoS One 
e0218011. 
80 However, the Drug Strategy’s ostensible claims to ‘harm reduction’ must be read in conjunction with its 
overarching focus on enforcement: 2(1)(a)(i). 
81 Neicun (n 79) 16. Indeed, the UK’s PSA stands out among other EU countries’ innovative responses to NPS 
for having no ‘harm’ criteria: EMCDDA and Eurojust, New Psychoactive Substances in Europe: Legislation 
and Prosecution–Current Challenges and Solutions (2016) 10.  
82 Council Recommendation EU Drugs Strategy 2013-20, OJ C402/01.  
83 Procedure 2013/0305/COD (n 61). 
84 Renaud N Colson, ‘Harmonizing NPS Legislation Across the European Union: An Utopia’ in Corazza and 
Roman-Urrestarazu (n 12, ch 1). 
85 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, sch 17. 
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exhaustive’.86 The TCDO’s and MDA’s substance-by-substance approaches were ill-equipped to 
provide a collectively exhaustive list of NPS due to the rate of NPS emergence, but the PSA plugged 
this gap with its blanket ban. Additionally, mutual exclusivity is ensured as substances can only be 
controlled under one of the three statutory measures at one time. Insofar as creating a prohibitive 
classificatory framework, the three measures are therefore coherent. However, one area of tension 
relates to custodial possession offences: the ACMD advised ‘that TCDOs should not be modified to 
include a custodial possession offence’ due to the PSA’s custodial possession offence’s inefficacy in 
reducing prison NPS use,87 but, conversely, among policymakers the ‘PSA has reduced the appeal 
of using [TCDOs as their use] involves removing the possession offence in custodial settings’.88  
 
A brief analysis of domestic drug policy, however, reveals greater dissonance. The aforementioned 
changes89 in numerous political parties’ drug policies have progressed to tension between the UK 
and Scottish Governments. Precipitated by Scotland’s record drug death rate, the Scottish 
Government created the Drug Deaths Taskforce, with a remit to review the current criminal justice 
approach to recreational drugs90 (which is reserved to the UK Parliament).91 Additionally, the Home 
Office vetoed plans for safe drug consumption facilities (whereby users can inject drugs under 
medical supervision) in Glasgow, despite Scottish cross-party support;92 and two drug policy 
summits held in 2020 (one arranged by the Scottish Government; the other by the UK Government) 
exposed ‘fundamental differences’ in the Scottish and UK approaches, with the former favouring ‘a 
public health approach focused on harm prevention’, while the latter ‘stressed the importance of 






86 Terance D Miethe and Wendy C Regoeczi, Rethinking Homicide: Exploring the Structure and Process 
Underlying Deadly Situations (2004) 48. 
87 ACMD, ‘Future Use and Purpose of Temporary Class Drug Orders (TCDOs)’ (2019) 2 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/8410
38/Future_use_and_purpose_of_Temporary_Class_Drug_Orders__TCDOs___003_.odt>. 
88 HOR (n 2, ch 1) 4. 
89 3(1)(a). 
90 ‘Scottish Drug Deaths Taskforce: One Year Report’ (2020) 15 
<https://drugdeathstaskforce.scot/media/1122/ddtf-report-full-report-final-amended-9-august-2020.pdf>. 
91 Scotland Act 1998, sch 5, para B1. 
92 ‘Cross-party Group Urges Home Office Rethink on “Fix Rooms”’ BBC News (21 July 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-49063485>. 
93 Bryan Christie, ‘Summit on Drug Deaths Ends with No Agreement’ (2020) 368 BMJ m822. 
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3(3) Relevance and Coherence: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has exposed cracks in the PSA’s continuing relevance, and highlighted nuances in its 
coherence with wider law and policy. The present UK Government has a democratic mandate to 
continue the criminal justice approach to recreational drugs. However, the key issue of Brexit – the 
details of which go contrary to the effective enforcement of drug laws – and the cross-minority-
party support for reviewing prohibitive drug legislation questions the PSA’s relevance going 
forward. Additionally, the changes in the NPS market, which is becoming increasingly technology-
facilitated and globalised, strike to the heart of the efficacy of the PSA’s original goals. 
 
International drug policy is undergoing a crossover. The softer stances adopted by individual states 
collectively demonstrate both the arrestment of the orthodox policy’s momentum and also gradual 
steps towards a replacement framework. If/when these changes will approach the climax which 
predicates a paradigm policy shift is unclear due to the ‘daunting political and procedural obstacles 
confronting [states] wishing to initiate [change]’.94 Until then, the PSA retains a strong claim to 
coherence with international traditional drug policy, not just formally, but also with the current 
substantive ‘crossover’ given the Act’s assonance with the international vogue of not criminalising 
drug use and possession. Yet, although the novelty of the NPS phenomenon is a likely explanation 
for the lack of an internally coherent international NPS policy, and thus drawing conclusions 
regarding the PSA’s coherence with international NPS policy is difficult, the PSA’s blanket ban does 
stand in sharp contrast to the approach of most other countries and the European Parliament’s 
appetite for allowing a ‘low-risk’ NPS market.  
Similar themes can be observed domestically. The UK’s legal framework for recreational drugs is 
normatively coherent, and allows for the mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
classification of drugs. However, the growing divide between the UK and Scottish Governments on 












This thesis evaluated the PSA from practical, theoretical and developmental perspectives. Chapter 
one considered the Act’s effectiveness with reference to its stated goals of: ending NPS sales; 
ending the game of cat and mouse; reducing psychoactive substance use; and reducing NPS-related 
harms. Using wider evaluative criteria than found in the HOR, it was argued – in contrast to the 
HOR’s findings – that the Act has failed to achieve most of these aims. 
Chapter two analysed the PSA’s efficiency from a theoretical standpoint. It argued that the Act is 
an inefficient statute, as it conflicts with numerous normative principles of criminalisation, namely: 
preventing harm (across three theoretical bases); criminalising only that which is wrongful; and fair 
labelling. It also was shown that the PSA conflicts with the rule of law-based principles of maximum 
certainty and proportionate sentencing. Lastly, it was argued that the PSA is an inefficient exercise 
of state power, and some alternative – and intrinsically more efficient – approaches to NPS 
regulation were sketched. 
Chapter three critiqued the PSA’s continuing relevance, noting that shifts in political priorities and 
technological advancements threaten to render its justificatory rationales obsolete. Similarly, while 
the Act’s claim to coherence with current international and domestic legislation is largely valid, the 
policies which underpin the PSA’s criminal justice approach to recreational drugs are being 
dismantled both internationally and within the UK. The ramifications of the various iterations of 


















% non-conviction rate PSA prosecutions = (n prosecutions - n sentences) / n prosecutions x 100 






Ratio = % non-conviction rate PSA prosecutions / average % non-conviction rate all drug offences 
= 34.48 / ((6.1 + 5.9 + 6.2) / 3) 





1.6% reported use at some point in their lives, of which 24.3% reported use in the preceding 12 
months.  





NPS-only positive tests = Total positive tests - total non-NPS positive tests 
   = 17.7% - 10.4% 
   = 7.3% 
 
Ratio = NPS-only positive tests / general population NPS prevalence 
 = 7.3 / 0.4 





The 2015 Government economic assessment of the PSA indicated that headshops would annually 
lose £32.6 million in profits and the Act would cost the criminal justice system £60m in the first year 
and £50m annually thereafter. It also claimed £20.9m would be saved based on 12 fewer fatalities 
(approximately £1.74m per death)95 and £0.2m from ‘reduced hospital admissions’ annually.  
Based on this the economic harm of the PSA has been: £130.4m in lost profits (to May 2020);96 
£210m in criminal justice system expenditure (to May 2020);97 £591.6m in Scottish fatalities (to the 
July 2019 statistics);98 a saving of £104.4m in English/Welsh fatalities (to the August 2019 
statistics);99 and an unknown loss due to the numbers of hospital admissions. This equates to a 
back-of-envelope overall economic cost estimate of £827.6m since enactment.100 The 2015 
 
95 Appendix 1.4.1. 
96 Appendix 1.4.2. 
97 Appendix 1.4.3. 
98 Appendix 1.4.4; Text to n 228, ch 1. 
99 Appendix 1.4.5; Text to n 229, ch 1. 
100 Appendix 1.4.6. 
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economic assessment projected that this figure should be £297.8m.101 This means the PSA has cost 
almost 2.78x more than projected.102 
 
1.4.1:  
£20.9m per year / 12 deaths per year = £1.74m per death per year. 
 
1.4.2:  
£32.6m per year x 4 years since enactment = £130.4m since enactment. 
 
1.4.3:  
£60m in the first year + (£50m per each subsequent year x 3 subsequent years) = £210m in criminal 
justice system expenditure since enactment.  
 
1.4.4:  
In Scotland in 2016, there were 286 deaths where NPS were ‘implicated in, or potentially 
contributed, to the death’. In 2017 and 2018, this number rose to 337 and 575, respectively. The 
net change in deaths in 2017 was (337 – 286 = 51) and in 2018 was (575 – 286 = 289). This gives a 
total net change of (51 + 289 = 340). When multiplied by the per-year death cost of £1.74m, this 
equates to an overall cost of (340 x £1.74m = £591.6m). 
 
1.4.5:  
In England and Wales in 2016, there were 123 deaths involving NPS. In 2017, this number fell to 61. 
In 2018, this number rose to 125. The net change in deaths in 2017 was (61 – 123 = -62) and in 2018 
was (125 – 123 = 2). This gives a total net change of (-62 + 2 = -60). When multiplied by the per-year 




£130.4m in lost profits + £210m in criminal justice system expenditure + £591.6m in Scottish deaths 
+ (-£104.4m) in English and Welsh deaths = £827.6m 
 
1.4.7: 
£130.4m in lost profits + £210m in criminal justice system expenditure - (£20.9m due to 12 fewer 
deaths per year x 2 years [to the latest statistics]) - (£0.2m due to reduced hospital admissions per 
year x 4 years) = £297.8m. 
 
1.4.8: 





28 months total sentence - 3 months maximum sentence for handling stolen goods - 6 months 
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